University at Buffalo School of Law

Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law
Journal Articles

Faculty Scholarship

9-23-2021

The Constitutionalization of Parole: Fulfilling the Promise of
Meaningful Review
Alexandra Harrington
University at Buffalo School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons, Juvenile Law Commons, and the Law Enforcement and
Corrections Commons

Recommended Citation
Alexandra Harrington, The Constitutionalization of Parole: Fulfilling the Promise of Meaningful Review,
106 Cornell L. Rev. 1173 (2021).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/journal_articles/1031

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons @ University
at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of
Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact
lawscholar@buffalo.edu.

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\106-5\CRN501.txt

unknown

Seq: 1

1-SEP-21

13:45

THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF PAROLE:
FULFILLING THE PROMISE OF
MEANINGFUL REVIEW
Alexandra Harrington†
Almost 12,000 people in the United States are serving life
sentences for crimes that occurred when they were children.
For most of these people, a parole board will determine how
long they will actually spend in prison. Recent Supreme Court
decisions have endorsed parole as a mechanism to ensure
that people who committed crimes as children are serving constitutionally proportionate sentences with a meaningful opportunity for release. Yet, in many states across the country,
parole is an opaque process with few guarantees. Parole decisions are considered “acts of grace” often left to the unreviewable discretion of the parole board.
This Article suggests a way to bring the current reality of
parole closer to the Court’s promise that parole can render life
sentences constitutional. This Article considers how the Supreme Court’s decisions in Graham, Miller, and Montgomery
work to constitutionalize parole and change the conventional
understanding of the board’s determination. The Article also
details the current standards of judicial review of parole board
decisions. Because parole is now operating to make constitutional the sentences of people who were children at the time of
the offense, the Eighth Amendment task placed on parole
boards’ shoulders necessitates substantive standards for the
parole board, as well as judicial scrutiny of the board’s
determinations.
The Article proposes two essential reforms: first, a presumption of release on parole for people who were children at
the time of the crime, absent a determination by clear and
convincing evidence that they have not rehabilitated; and second, independent judicial review of the parole board decision
to determine if the evidence supports defeating the presump† Associate Professor of Law and Director, Criminal Justice Advocacy Clinic,
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tion that life in prison is disproportionate for the vast majority
of people who committed crimes as children.
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INTRODUCTION
Almost 12,000 people in the United States are serving life
sentences for crimes that occurred when they were children.1
Most of those people are reliant on the parole system to ensure
that they will not in fact spend the rest of their lives in prison.
In other words, an administrative parole board, rather than a
1
Youth Sentenced to Life Imprisonment, SENTENCING PROJECT (Oct. 8, 2019),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/youth-sentenced-life-imprisonment/ [https://perma.cc/L4PP-UJAQ].
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sentencing or reviewing court, will determine how long they will
actually spend behind bars. The Supreme Court has endorsed
parole as a mechanism to ensure that people who committed
crimes as children are serving constitutionally proportionate
sentences with a meaningful opportunity for release. Yet, in
many states across the country, parole is an opaque process
with few guarantees. Individuals may be denied parole for reasons—for example, the nature of the offense—that were set in
stone at the time the crime took place. Parole applicants may
have no recourse for hearings that fail to provide meaningful
consideration and may be denied access to judicial review.
This Article suggests a way to bring the current reality of parole
closer to the Court’s promise that parole can render life
sentences constitutional. I propose a presumption of release
on parole for people who were children at the time of the crime,
as well as judicial review of parole board denials to ensure that
these individuals are not forced to serve a disproportionate
sentence in prison.
In the last decade, the Supreme Court issued a series of
decisions giving children sentenced to life in prison hope of a
future beyond bars. First, in 2005 the Court in Roper v. Simmons held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid
the death penalty for individuals who were under age eighteen
at the time of their crime.2 Then, in 2010 in Graham v. Florida,
the Court found that life without parole is an unconstitutional
sentence for someone under age eighteen convicted of a
nonhomicide crime, concluding that the State must “give defendants like Graham some meaningful opportunity to obtain
release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”3
Following closely on the heels of Graham, in 2012 the Court in
Miller v. Alabama prohibited mandatory life without parole for
juveniles, regardless of the offense.4
In 2016, Montgomery v. Louisiana made Miller’s prohibition
retroactive, holding that “Miller announced a substantive rule
of constitutional law.”5 The Court continued: “A State may
remedy a Miller violation by permitting juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole, rather than by resentencing them.”6 The Court asserted, without further analysis, that
“[a]llowing those offenders to be considered for parole ensures
2
3
4
5
6

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74–75 (2010).
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012).
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016).
Id.
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that juveniles whose crimes reflected only transient immaturity—and who have since matured—will not be forced to serve a
disproportionate sentence in violation of the Eighth Amendment.”7 This statement appears to presume that someone who
demonstrates to a parole board that his juvenile crimes reflected only transient immaturity will not serve a sentence of
life in prison. Yet, the Court’s vague promise leaves unanswered the important question of what standards, if any, juvenile parole hearings must satisfy in order to comply with
Miller’s constitutional requirements.
The Court’s most recent decision in Jones v. Mississippi
complicates the landscape. In that case, the Court held that a
finding of permanent incorrigibility is not required before sentencing a juvenile to life without parole.8 In some ways perhaps
Jones changes little: the Court explicitly said that it leaves
Miller and Montgomery intact.9 The decision did not address
parole or back–end review of sentences but rather focused on
the front–end sentencing decision.10 Yet, Jones also hollowed
the earlier precedent into an unrecognizable shell of itself, insisting that sentencing discretion is all that is constitutionally
required.11 This Article proceeds by taking the Court at its word
that it did not overrule Miller and Montgomery12 and by asking
what those decisions might have to say about parole release
determinations. This Article proposes that, notwithstanding
the Jones decision, states take seriously the call to make sentencing and parole meaningful for people who were children at
the time of the crime.
Jurisdictions have reacted to the Supreme Court’s decisions in varied ways. Many states have responded by providing
parole eligibility for individuals convicted as juveniles.13 Despite variations in parole standards and procedures, courts
across the country have treated parole eligibility as a curative
fix for sentences that fail to account for the defendant’s youth
and youth-related mitigation. Indeed, the availability of parole
resulted in the dismissal of one of the most recent juvenile
sentencing case in which the Supreme Court granted certio7

Id.
Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1319 (2021).
9
Id. at 1321.
10
See, e.g., id. at 1313 (concluding that a “discretionary sentencing system is
both constitutionally necessary and constitutionally sufficient”).
11
Id.
12
This takes up the invitation of the dissent to “hold this Court to its word.”
Id. at 1337 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
13
See infra subpart I.B.
8
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rari.14 In Mathena v. Malvo, the Court took up the question
whether Montgomery can appropriately be understood as expanding Miller.15 After the Virginia legislature reinstated parole for people who were under age eighteen at the time of the
crime,16 the Court dismissed the case,17 affirming the idea that
the availability of parole fixes constitutional violations inherent
in a life sentence for someone who was a child at the time of the
crime. Other courts have similarly rejected, based on parole
eligibility, claims regarding the constitutionality of a defendant’s sentence.18
Courts have been loath to interfere in parole boards’ decision making. This Article compiles, in all fifty states, the standards for courts’ review of parole board decisions. These
standards skew heavily towards deference to the boards’ “expertise.”19 I question whether the same deference that courts
give to parole board determinations generally ought to apply in
the context of juvenile parole hearings. For individuals who
were juveniles at the time of the crime, the parole board is now
making a constitutional determination—whether life in prison
is a proportionate punishment for this individual. I argue that
reasons for deferring to the boards’ expertise do not apply in
the juvenile parole context.
What, then, should a court’s review of a parole release
determination look like? One possible means to vindicate
rights at a juvenile parole hearing would be to rely on procedu14
See Malvo v. Mathena, 893 F.3d 265 (4th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S.
Ct. 1317 (2019) (mem.), and cert. dismissed, 140 S. Ct. 919 (2020) (mem.).
15
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Mathena v. Malvo, 139 S. Ct. 1317
(2019), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 1317 (2019) (mem.), and cert. dismissed, 140 S.
Ct. 919 (2020) (mem.) (No. 18-217) (framing the question presented as whether
Montgomery can “properly be interpreted as modifying and substantively expanding” the rule in Miller).
16
VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-136 (West), VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-165.1 (West), 2020
Va. Acts ch. 2.
17
Mathena v. Malvo, 140 S. Ct. 919, 919 (2020) (mem.).
18
For example, in Connecticut, where I practiced, the state supreme court
relied on the availability of parole under newly enacted state legislation to determine that the defendant’s sentence “no longer falls within the purview of Miller.”
State v. Delgado, 151 A.3d 345, 351–52 (Conn. 2016); see also State v. McCleese,
215 A.3d 1154, 1197 (Conn. 2019) (rejecting a related claim on state constitutional grounds). Other states have adopted similar analyses. See, e.g., People v.
Franklin, 370 P.3d 1053, 1054 (Cal. 2016) (finding that eligibility for parole after
twenty-five years in prison mooted constitutional claim under Miller); State ex rel.
Jenkins v. State, 2017-0302, p. 1 (La. 8/31/18); 252 So. 3d 476, 476 (concluding
that no resentencing necessary because relator was parole-eligible); Manley v.
State, No. 63120, 2016 WL 1335379, at *1 (Nev. Apr. 1, 2016) (concluding that
parole eligibility provides any relief afforded by Miller).
19
See infra subpart II.B.
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ral protections. Indeed, some jurisdictions have instituted
rights to counsel, to an in-person hearing, to present evidence,
and to receive a list of reasons for denial. These are important
protections, to be sure. But, alone, they do not prevent the
board from forcing someone who demonstrates maturity and
rehabilitation to serve life in prison.
This Article proposes that the Eighth Amendment has
something to say about the substance of the parole board’s
decision and not only about the process by which it reaches its
determination. Montgomery means that if the State chooses
not to resentence someone serving life in prison for a crime
committed as a juvenile, it must provide an opportunity for
parole. Similarly, if a juvenile was sentenced or resentenced to
life—which in some states includes long, term-of-year
sentences—with parole, the availability of parole is ostensibly
what makes the sentence Graham- and Miller-compliant. In
these instances, the law presumes that parole eligibility prevents the sentence from being unconstitutional.
The question, then, is whether the opportunity for something called “parole” is sufficient to fulfill the intent of these
decisions or whether we must critically revise the conventional
concept of parole. This Article proposes an understanding of
Graham, Miller, and Montgomery as together signifying that
people who were juveniles at the time of the crime have a constitutional interest in the parole board’s determination. In order for juvenile parole hearings to perform the constitutional
function the Court assigns to them, the board should grant
release unless it determines by clear and convincing evidence
that the juvenile parole applicant has not matured and rehabilitated. A court must be able to review this decision to independently determine whether the evidence justifies a denial—that
is, whether the constitutional question was answered correctly.
This Article is divided into the following parts. Part I provides an overview of the recent Supreme Court decisions on
juvenile sentencing as they address the importance of rehabilitation, the need for a meaningful opportunity for release, and
the possibility of parole as a constitutional remedy for a sentencing violation. This section also details the state legislative
and judicial responses to the Court’s decisions. Part II assesses the traditional understanding of the parole board’s decision and presents research on the standards of judicial review
of parole board decisions in all fifty states. Part III makes the
case that Graham, Miller, and Montgomery constitutionalize parole and transform it from a discretionary, subjective determi-
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nation into a vindication of a substantive, Eighth Amendment
right. This Part proposes a presumption of release for juvenile
parole applicants. Part IV examines the case for heightened
judicial review of juvenile parole determinations and proposes
a standard of review that focuses on the board’s decision and
whether the evidence supports overcoming the presumption of
rehabilitation.
I
BACKGROUND ON RECENT JUVENILE SENTENCING LAW AND
LEGISLATION
A. Overview of Supreme Court Decisions on Sentencing
Juveniles in Adult Court
Since the Court issued its decision in Roper v. Simmons
over a decade ago, much attention has been given to the
Court’s line of cases addressing juvenile sentencing. This subpart provides a brief overview of the cases and focuses particularly on the aspects that address the possibility for
rehabilitation and the need for an opportunity for release.
In 2005 the Court decided Roper v. Simmons, holding the
death penalty unconstitutional for those whose crimes occurred when they were under age eighteen.20 The Court reasoned that juveniles “cannot with reliability be classified
among the worst offenders” because of certain characteristics
inherent in youth: immaturity, heightened vulnerability to peer
pressure and negative influences, and capacity for change.21
The Court emphasized that youth is mitigating particularly because the “signature qualities of youth are transient.”22 In
other words, as people age, their propensity for impulsive and
reckless behavior, as well as their susceptibility to outside
pressures, will diminish.
In 2010 in Graham v. Florida, the Court held that life without parole is unconstitutional for a juvenile convicted of a
nonhomicide crime.23 While analyzing the penological justifications for a life without parole sentence, the Court reasoned
that such a penalty forecloses the possibility of rehabilitation.24
The Court explained: “By denying the defendant the right to
reenter the community, the State makes an irrevocable judgment about that person’s value and place in society. This judg20
21
22
23
24

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
Id. at 569–70.
Id. at 570.
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74–75 (2010).
See id. at 74.
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ment is not appropriate in light of a juvenile nonhomicide
offender’s capacity for change and limited moral culpability.”25
The Court ultimately concluded that because of juveniles’ diminished culpability and capacity for rehabilitation, the State
cannot incarcerate a juvenile convicted of a nonhomicide offense without a meaningful chance at life outside of prison.
While the State need not “guarantee eventual freedom,” it must
provide “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based
on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”26
In 2012 Miller v. Alabama expanded on the Graham decision and prohibited mandatory life without parole for juveniles,
regardless of the offense.27 The Court emphasized that Graham’s pronouncements about children’s inherent characteristics and vulnerabilities apply to all children regardless of the
offense of conviction.28 The Court concluded that sentencing
courts must consider youth-related mitigation “before imposing the harshest possible penalty for juveniles.”29 A sentencing
scheme that fails to account for youth “poses too great a risk of
disproportionate punishment.”30
In 2016 in Montgomery v. Louisiana, the Court held that
Miller’s prohibition applied retroactively because it was “a substantive rule of constitutional law.”31 The Court reasoned that
Miller’s rule is that a sentence of life without parole “is excessive for all but ‘the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects
irreparable corruption.’”32
The Court went on to address the states’ concerns that
they would be subject to a flood of resentencing hearings
should Miller apply to convictions that were final.33 The Court
reassured states that they would not be required to relitigate
every single life-without-parole sentence. Rather, states could
remedy the constitutional violation that occurred at sentencing
by providing people who were children at the time of the crime
with parole eligibility. The Court explained:
Allowing those offenders to be considered for parole ensures
that juveniles whose crimes reflected only transient immaturity—and who have since matured—will not be forced to
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33

Id.
Id. at 75.
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012).
See id. at 471–73.
Id. at 489.
Id. at 479.
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016).
Id. at 734 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 479–80).
See id. at 736.
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serve a disproportionate sentence in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. . . . Those prisoners who have shown an inability to reform will continue to serve life sentences. The opportunity for release will be afforded to those who demonstrate
the truth of Miller’s central intuition—that children who commit even heinous crimes are capable of change.34

So, the Court assumed, someone who demonstrates to the parole board that they have indeed reformed will not “continue to
serve [a] life sentence[ ].”35 The Court concluded that people
who were children at the time of the crime “must be given the
opportunity to show their crime did not reflect irreparable corruption; and, if it did not, their hope for some years of life
outside prison walls must be restored.”36 The Court thus sanctioned the spate of state legislative fixes granting parole eligibility to individuals who were sentenced to life in prison for crimes
committed as juveniles.
In Mathena v. Malvo, which has been referred to colloquially as the “D.C. sniper case” because of the infamous crime for
which the petitioner was convicted,37 the Supreme Court
seemed poised to explain how Montgomery ought to be interpreted.38 The Court was presented with the question whether
Montgomery can “properly [be] interpreted as modifying and
substantially expanding the very rule whose retroactivity was
in question.”39 Mathena v. Malvo involved a juvenile who was
sentenced to life without parole in Virginia, where the sentencing options for capital murder were death or life imprisonment.40 The Fourth Circuit held that Mr. Malvo was entitled to
resentencing, under an interpretation of Miller that “the Eighth
Amendment bars life-without-parole sentences for all but those
rare juvenile offenders whose crimes reflect permanent incorri34

Id.
Id.
36
Id. at 736–37.
37
See, e.g., Amy Howe, Argument Analysis: “D.C. Sniper” Case Could Hinge
on Kavanaugh, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 16, 2019, 4:28 PM), https://
www.scotusblog.com/2019/10/argument-analysis-d-c-sniper-case-could-hingeon-kavanaugh/ [https://perma.cc/Y4V5-YVDZ] (using “D.C. sniper case” to refer
to Mathena v. Malvo).
38
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 15, at i (presenting the question whether Montgomery can “properly be interpreted as modifying and substantively expanding” the rule in Miller).
39
Brief for Petitioner at i, Mathena v. Malvo, 193 S. Ct. 1317 (2019), cert.
granted, 139 S. Ct. 1317 (2019) (mem.), and cert. dismissed, 140 S. Ct. 919 (2020)
(mem.) (No. 18-217).
40
Brief for Respondent at 8–10, Mathena v. Malvo, 193 S. Ct. 1317 (2019),
cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 1317 (2019) (mem.), and cert. dismissed, 140 S. Ct. 919
(2020) (mem.) (No. 18-217).
35

R
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gibility.”41 The court reasoned that the jury had no option to
impose “a sentence less than life without parole” and was never
instructed to determine whether the crimes “reflected irreparable corruption,” which, the court explained, is a “prerequisite to
imposing a life-without parole sentence[.]”42 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari and the Court heard argument in October 2019.43 In early 2020, however, the Virginia legislature
enacted a law that reinstated parole, previously defunct in the
Commonwealth, for people who were under age eighteen at the
time of the crime.44 Based on this change, the parties filed a
stipulation of dismissal and the Court dismissed the case on
February 26, 2020.45 While postponing the question of how
the Court might clarify its earlier decisions, the dismissal in
Malvo affirms the idea that the availability of parole can fix the
Eighth Amendment violations inherent in a life sentence for
someone who was under age eighteen at the time of the crime.
As soon as Mr. Malvo became eligible for parole, the parties and
the Court agreed that the constitutional arguments were moot.
Most recently, the Supreme Court addressed whether
Miller and Montgomery require a judge to make a finding of
permanent incorrigibility before sentencing a juvenile to life
without parole.46 In Jones v. Mississippi, decided in 2021, the
Court rejected the petitioner’s argument and held that a finding
of permanent incorrigibility was not required.47 The Court asserted that a discretionary sentencing scheme is both “constitutionally necessary and constitutionally sufficient.”48 In
rendering its decision, the Court emphasized that it was not
overruling prior precedent; rather its decision “carefully follow[ed] both Miller and Montgomery.”49
Yet, while claiming fidelity to earlier precedent and citing to
portions of Montgomery that address Miller’s substantive requirements,50 the Court’s decision reduced Miller to a procedu41
Malvo v. Mathena, 893 F.3d 265, 274 (4th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S.
Ct. 1317 (2019) (mem.), and cert. dismissed, 140 S. Ct. 919 (2020) (mem.).
42
Id. at 275.
43
Mathena v. Malvo, 193 S. Ct. 1317 (2019), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 1317
(2019) (mem.), and cert. dismissed, 140 S. Ct. 919 (2020) (mem.).
44
2020 Va. Acts ch. 2.
45
Mathena v. Malvo, 140 S. Ct. 919 (2020) (mem.).
46
Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307 (2021).
47
Id. at 1319.
48
Id. at 1313.
49
Id. at 1321.
50
See, e.g., id. at 1315 n.2 (quoting Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 211, “False That
Miller did not impose a formal factfinding requirement does not leave States free to
sentence a child whose crime reflects transient immaturity to life without parole.
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ral requirement that youth be considered at sentencing.51 The
Court did so without addressing Miller’s or Montgomery’s proabout the disproportionality of a
nouncements
life–without–parole sentence for the vast majority of people who
were children at the time of the crime. Instead, the Jones Court
magnified the role of discretion. Discretion, the Court explained, “allows the sentencer to consider the defendant’s
youth, and thereby helps ensure that life–without–parole
sentences are imposed only in cases where that sentence is
appropriate in light of the defendant’s age.”52 Indeed, as the
Court clarified, as long as the sentencer has discretion to consider youth, “the sentencer necessarily will consider the defendant’s youth.”53
The decision occasioned both a forceful concurrence and
dissent. In his concurrence Justice Thomas observed that the
majority “[o]verrule[d] Montgomery in substance but not in
name.”54 While rebuking the Court for not going far enough in
rejecting Montgomery, Justice Thomas lamented that Jones
“fail[ed] to condemn Montgomery’s expansion of Miller to an
entire category of individuals.”55 By contrast, the dissent
penned by Justice Sotomayor censured the Court for “distort[ing] Miller and Montgomery beyond recognition” and failing
to address “Montgomery’s clear articulation of Miller’s essential
holding.”56 Discretionary sentencing cannot be constitutionally
sufficient, argued the dissent, because “[n]o set of discretionary
sentencing procedures can render a sentence of LWOP constitutional for a juvenile whose crime reflects ‘unfortunate yet
transient immaturity’.”57
What remains is a decision asserting that the holdings of
Miller and Montgomery are intact while seeming to defang them
To the contrary, Miller established that this punishment is disproportionate under
the Eighth Amendment.”).
51
See, e.g., Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1314 (quoting Miller as requiring “only that a
sentencer follow a certain process”; Id. at 1316 (explaining that “Miller cited Roper
and Graham for a simple proposition: Youth matters in sentencing.”); Id. at
52
Id. at 1318.
53
Id. at 1319. This illustrates one of the decision’s fundamental flaws: an
ignorance—perhaps intentional—of the realities of sentencing. A sentencer given
discretion could certainly choose to disregard youth–related mitigation, as appears to be happening in a number of states post–Montgomery. See Id. at 1333
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing Mississippi’s greater–than–25%
life–without–parole resentencing rate and Louisiana’s practice of imposing the
sentence on most of the juvenile defendants sentenced since Miller was decided).
54
Id. at 1327 (Thomas, J., concurring).
55
Id. at 1327–28.
56
Id. at 1330–31 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
57
Id. at 1332.
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entirely.58 This Article takes the Jones Court at its word that it
did not overrule earlier decisions and offers a path forward to
states who seek to provide meaning to Miller’s and Montgomery’s assertion that life in prison is disproportionate for the vast
majority of juveniles.
B. Overview of State Responses: Fixing Sentences
Through the Courts or Through Parole Review
Since the Supreme Court issued its decisions in Graham,
Miller, and Montgomery, twenty-two states59 and the District of
58
Compare Id. at 1321 (asserting that the decision “carefully follows both
Miller and Montgomery” and does not overrule them), and Id. at 1318 (seeming to
affirm the substantive requirement of Miller: discretionary sentencing “helps ensure that life–without–parole sentences are imposed only in cases where that
sentence is appropriate in light of the defendant’s age”), with Id. at 1313 (asserting
that discretion at sentencing is constitutionally sufficient to meet Eighth Amendment guarantees), and Id. at 1319 (implicitly rejecting the idea that a life without
parole sentence may be disproportionate for certain people; explaining that one
sentencer may decide youth–related mitigation requires a sentence less than life
without parole while another sentencer on the same facts may “decide that life
without parole remains appropriate”).
59
Those states are Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West
Virginia, and Wyoming. See H.B. 2668, 83rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2010); State v.
Sweet, 879 N.W.2d 811, 839 (Iowa 2016); State v. Bassett, 428 P.3d 343, 346
(Wash. 2018); S.B. 294, 91st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2017) (codified as
amended at ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-108 (2017)); S.B. 394, 2017-2018 Reg. Sess.
(Cal. 2017); S.B. 16-181, 70th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2016); S.B. 796,
2015 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2015); S.B. 9, 147th Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (Del. 2013); H.B. 2116, 27th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2014); H. 4307, 188th
Gen. Court (Mass. 2014); A.B. 267, 78th Sess. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2015);
A. 373, 217th Leg. Assemb. (N.J. 2017); H.B. 1195, 65th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(N.D. 2017); S.B. 1008, 80th Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2019); S.B. 140, 2016
Leg., Reg. Sess. (S.D. 2016); S.B. 2, 83d Leg. (Tex. 2013); H.B. 405, 2016 Gen.
Sess. (Utah 2016); H. 62, 73d Sess. (Vt. 2015); H.B. 35, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (Va. 2020); H.B. 4210, 81st Leg., 2d Sess. (W. Va. 2014); H.B. 23, 62d Leg.,
Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2013). In addition, Alaska does not (and did not even before
2012) authorize a life without parole sentence. See ALASKA STAT. ANN.
§§ 12.55.015, 12.55.125 (West 2020) (authorizing determinate sentences up to
ninety-nine years for felony convictions). Someone convicted of first-degree murder under certain circumstances can be sentenced to a mandatory term of ninetynine years in prison, which does not carry parole eligibility. See ALASKA STAT. ANN.
§§ 12.55.125(a), 33.16.090(a)(1)(A) (West 2020). However, no one in the state has
been sentenced to life without parole for a crime committed as a juvenile. See No
Life Sentences Without Parole for Juveniles in Alaska, AP NEWS (July 31, 2017),
https://apnews.com/article/ad7e9c6756744b21b757d65cce39e6fb [https://
perma.cc/9GMZ-SATP]. Maine, New Mexico, New York, and Rhode Island do not
impose the sentence in practice. See Maine Has Long Avoided Life Sentences for
Juveniles, AP NEWS (July 31, 2017), https://apnews.com/article/
85f1a838418543ebb299b218920a9903 [https://perma.cc/K28S-P55B] (reporting that the state attorney general’s office is unaware of any juvenile life without
parole sentences in the state); Lawyer: New Mexico Man Serving De Facto Life
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Columbia60 have prohibited imposition of a life-without-parole
sentence on someone who was under age eighteen at the time
of the crime. Six of those states have made the prohibition
retroactive,61 while in most of the states the ban on life without
parole operates only prospectively.
Some states have elected to have courts review long
sentences for people who were children at the time of the offense. Thirteen states have provided for automatic resentencing of juveniles who were previously sentenced to life without
parole.62 The following five jurisdictions allow people who were
under age eighteen at the time of the offense to petition the
court for review of their sentence after they have served a cerWithout Parole, AP NEWS (July 31, 2017), https://apnews.com/article/ce3b3ba
805b04e24a1ff86daf07704f1 [https://perma.cc/5U7E-8F4S] (stating that corrections officials report no one serving life without parole for juvenile offenses);
New York Now Considers Youth as a Factor for Inmates’ Parole, AP NEWS (July 31,
2017), https://apnews.com/article/3ad299fe4cd04150806c84aa1378eed1
[https://perma.cc/9E5Y-FMJH] (reporting that “New York has not sentenced
juveniles to life in prison without parole”); Rhode Island’s Try to Ban Juvenile Life
Without Parole Fails, AP NEWS (July 31, 2017), https://apnews.com/article/
23440555f419449e8f374102d321ccae [https://perma.cc/ES52-QFQB] (reporting that Rhode Island “has never sought life without parole for a juvenile”).
60
63 D.C. Reg. 15312 (Dec. 16, 2016) (effective Apr. 4, 2017).
61
Those states are Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
and Nevada. See Ark. S.B. 294; Cal. S.B. 394; Colo. S.B. 16-181; Conn. S.B. 796;
Del. S.B. 9; Nev. A.B. 267.
62
The states that have provided for automatic resentencing are Alabama,
Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Jersey, North
Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Washington. Six state
courts—Florida, Illinois, Mississippi, Nebraska, South Carolina, and Tennessee—
had held before Montgomery was decided that Miller was retroactive. See Falcon v.
State, 162 So. 3d 954, 964 (Fla. 2015); People v. Davis, 6 N.E.3d 709, 722 (Ill.
2014); Jones v. State, 122 So. 3d 698, 703 (Miss. 2013); State v. Mantich, 842
N.W.2d 716, 731 (Neb. 2014); Aiken v. Byars, 765 S.E.2d 572, 575 (S.C. 2014); Ex
parte Maxwell, 424 S.W.3d 66, 75 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). Five states decided,
post-Montgomery, to resentence juveniles whose mandatory life-without-parole
sentences had been final. Alabama and North Carolina did so through state
supreme court decisions. See Ex parte Williams, 244 So. 3d 100, 101 (Ala. 2017);
Wynn v. State, 246 So. 3d 163, 187–89 (Ala. Crim. App. 2016); State v. Perry, 794
S.E.2d 280, 281–82 (N.C. 2016). Colorado, Michigan, and Washington enacted
legislation to provide for resentencing of those who were juveniles at the time of
the crime. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.035(1) (2020) (noting that Washington also
prospectively eliminated life without parole for individuals who were under age
eighteen at the time of the offense); Colo. S.B. 16-181 (noting that Colorado also
retroactively eliminated life without parole for people who were juveniles at the
time of their crimes); S.B. 319, 97th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2014). New Jersey and
Pennsylvania have relied on resentencing without explicitly addressing Miller’s
remedy for individuals sentenced to life without parole. See, e.g., State v. Zuber,
152 A.3d 197, 202 (N.J. 2017) (remanding case involving life-without-parole sentence for resentencing); Commonwealth v. Jones, 135 A.3d 175, 175 (Pa. 2016)
(per curiam) (remanding life-without-parole case on collateral review to trial court
for resentencing); Commonwealth v. Williams, 133 A.3d 4, 4 (Pa. 2016) (per
curiam) (same).
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tain number of years in prison.63 Florida provides for sentence
review after fifteen to twenty-five years for people convicted of
certain offenses.64 California allows some people sentenced to
life without parole to petition the court for resentencing after
fifteen years.65 Delaware allows juveniles sentenced to more
than twenty years in prison to petition for sentence modification after twenty or thirty years, depending on the crime.66
North Dakota provides petitions for sentence reduction after
twenty years in prison.67 The District of Columbia allows for
sentence modifications after fifteen years.68
Meanwhile, other states have placed the responsibility for
reviewing how long people should be in prison in the hands of
the parole board. Seventeen states have responded to the Supreme Court decisions by providing parole eligibility for
juveniles.69 The timing for parole eligibility ranges from fifteen
63
This number includes Florida, which also provides for resentencing hearings for those serving mandatory life-without-parole sentences for crimes that
occurred when they were juveniles. See Falcon, 162 So. 3d at 964. In addition,
even before the recent Supreme Court decisions, Oregon provided “second look”
hearings for individuals who were convicted in adult court of crimes that occurred
when they were under age eighteen. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 420A.203(1) (West
2020). The statute provides that after the individual has served half the prison
term, they are eligible for sentence review to determine if they should continue to
serve the remainder of their term or should be conditionally released. Id.
64
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.1402(2)(a)–(c) (West 2020).
65
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(2)(A)(i) (West 2020). California has also enacted
parole provisions, as described below, specific to people who were under age
eighteen at the time of the crime. See Cal. S.B. 394.
66
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4204A(d)(1)–(2) (West 2020). The state also passed
legislation providing for resentencing of juveniles serving mandatory life without
parole sentences. Del. S.B. 9, § 6.
67
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-32-13.1(a) (West 2020).
68
D.C. Code Ann. § 24-403.03 (West 2020). D.C. Act 21-568, which became
effective April 4, 2017, provided for sentence review after the individual had
served twenty years in prison. 63 D.C. Reg. 15312 (Dec. 16, 2016) (effective
Apr. 4, 2017). The law was amended in 2018 to allow sentence modifications after
fifteen years rather than twenty years. 66 D.C. Reg. 1627 (Jan. 30, 2019) (effective May 10, 2019). The amendments also changed the statutory language from
the “court may” reduce a term of imprisonment to the “court shall” reduce a term
of imprisonment. Id. (emphasis added).
69
Those states are Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Iowa, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, Oregon, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. The most recent of these bills in
Virginia was passed in February 2020. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-125a(f) (2020);
HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 706-656(1), 706-669(1) (West 2020); LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:574.4
(2020); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 878.1 (2020); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9.94A.730 (LexisNexis 2020); Jackson v. State, 883 N.W.2d 272, 282 (Minn.
2016); State v. Mares, 335 P.3d 487, 498 (Wyo. 2014); H.B. 2593, 51st Leg., 2d
Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2014); S.B. 294, 91st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2017);
S.B. 394, 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017); S.B. 16-180, 70th Gen. Assemb., 2d
Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2016); S. File 448, 86th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Iowa 2015);
S.B. 16, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2017); H. 4307, 188th Gen. Court (Mass.
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to thirty years, depending on the state and the crime of conviction. Eight states have created new rules specific to juvenile
parole hearings. Arkansas requires the parole board to consider, among other things, “[t]he hallmark features of
youth . . . [s]ubsequent growth and increased maturity . . . [i]mmaturity . . . at the time of the offense.”70 California’s juvenile parole legislation was intended to require the
board to “give great weight to the diminished culpability of
youth as compared to adults, the hallmark features of youth,
and any subsequent growth and increased maturity.”71 Colorado allows individuals with felony convictions for crimes committed as juveniles to petition for admission to a Department of
Correction program, after which they can apply for early parole
and will be presumed to meet the criteria for release if they
have served a certain amount of time in prison.72 Connecticut
requires the parole board to consider evidence of rehabilitation,
taking into account, among other things, “the age and circumstances of such person as of the date of the commission of the
crime or crimes, whether such person has demonstrated remorse and increased maturity.”73 Missouri passed legislation
mandating parole board consideration of “[e]fforts made toward
rehabilitation” and “[t]he subsequent growth and increased
maturity of the person.”74 Oregon directs the board to “consider and give substantial weight to the fact that a person
under 18 years of age is incapable of the same reasoning and
impulse control as an adult and the diminished culpability of
2014); S.B. 590, 98th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2016); A.B. 267, 78th
Sess. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2015); S.B. 1008, 80th Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Or. 2019); H.B. 35, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2020); H.B. 4210, 81st
Leg., 2d Sess. (W. Va. 2014); H.B. 23, 62d Leg., Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2013). Colorado
and Washington also provide for resentencing hearings for juveniles with
mandatory life sentences. See § 9.94A.730; S.B. 16-180, 70th Gen. Assemb., 2d
Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2016).
70
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-93-621(b)(2)(B), (C), (E) (West 2020). Note that the
Arkansas Supreme Court had previously held that Miller applies retroactively and
mandates resentencing for juveniles sentenced to mandatory life without parole.
See Kelley v. Gordon, 465 S.W.3d 842, 846 (Ark. 2015); Jackson v. Norris, 426
S.W.3d 906, 910–11 (Ark. 2013). The new parole legislation does not apply to
defendants whose sentences were vacated for resentencing under Kelley and
Jackson at the time of the legislation’s enactment. See Harris v. State, 547
S.W.3d 64, 70–71 (Ark. 2018).
71
S.B. 394, 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017); see also CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 3051(f)(1) (West 2020) (requiring any evaluations or risk assessments used by
the board to consider “the diminished culpability of youth as compared to that of
adults, the hallmark features of youth, and any subsequent growth and increased
maturity of the individual”).
72
See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-34-102(4), (8)(a) (West 2020).
73
§ 54-125a(f).
74
S.B. 590, 98th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2016).
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minors as compared to that of adults.”75 Washington created a
mechanism for individuals to petition for early release after
twenty years in prison with a presumption that they will be
released unless the board finds they are likely to violate the
law.76 West Virginia enacted a statute that requires a parole
board to consider “the diminished culpability of juveniles as
compared to that of adults, the hallmark features of youth, and
any subsequent growth and increased maturity of the prisoner
during incarceration.”77
In states that have created parole eligibility provisions for
people with juvenile offenses, some courts have explicitly held
that such parole eligibility is a sufficient remedy for a Miller
violation such that resentencing is not required. The California
Supreme Court held in People v. Franklin that the legislative
provision of parole after twenty-five years in prison mooted the
juvenile defendant’s constitutional claim under Miller.78 Significantly for the court, the California statute in question “requires the Board not just to consider but to ‘give great weight to
the diminished culpability of juveniles as compared to adults,
the hallmark features of youth, and any subsequent growth
and increased maturity . . . .’”79 The legislation, the court
found, was “designed to ensure [people who committed crimes
as juveniles] will have a meaningful opportunity for release.”80
In analyzing Franklin’s claim that a court rather than the administrative parole board should consider the relevance of his
youth to sentencing, the court concluded that “Miller did not
restrict the ability of states to impose life with parole sentences
on juvenile offenders; such sentences necessarily contemplate
that a parole authority will decide whether a juvenile offender is
suitable for release.”81 In State v. Vera, the Arizona Appellate
Court reached a similar conclusion, determining that legislation that reintroduced the possibility of parole for individuals
who were under age eighteen at the time of the offense provided
the “‘meaningful opportunity’ for release contemplated by
Miller and Graham.”82 Parole had been eliminated in Arizona
for crimes committed after 1994, but 2014 legislation rein75

OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 144.397 (West 2019).
See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.730 (LexisNexis 2020).
77
H.B. 4210, 81st Leg., 2d Sess. (W. Va. 2014).
78
370 P.3d 1053, 1054 (Cal. 2016).
79
Id. at 1060 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 4801(C) (West 2018)).
80
Id.
81
Id. at 1064.
82
334 P.3d 754, 761 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560
U.S. 48, 75 (2010)).
76
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stated parole for individuals who were under age eighteen at
the time of the crime.83 Mr. Vera argued that the new legislation was insufficient to cure the Miller violation that occurred
when the sentencing court failed to consider his youth.84 The
appellate court disagreed, finding that the legislation remedied
Arizona’s sentencing scheme sufficiently to comply with Miller
and Graham.85 The court reasoned that “an opportunity for
parole” was consistent with a “‘meaningful opportunity’ for
release.”86
Yet, the question remains whether an opportunity for parole, without more, is sufficient to fulfill the Supreme Court’s
promise that only the rare, irreparably corrupt juvenile will
serve life in prison, or whether the constitutionally mandated
“meaningful opportunity to obtain release”87 must look different—in process, in consideration, or in standard of review—
than a traditional parole release determination. An examination of the traditional conception of parole can shed light on
how the Court’s recent decisions might alter that conventional
understanding.

83
See H.B. 2593, 51st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2014); S.B. 1049, 41st Leg.,
1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 1993).
84
Vera, 334 P.3d at 756.
85
Id. at 761.
86
Id. (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 75); see also State v. McCleese, 215 A.3d
1154, 1173 (Conn. 2019) (explaining that parole eligibility “is a meaningful, practical, and constitutionally sufficient remedy in light of the fact that no remedy can
travel back in time and provide the defendant with a Miller compliant sentencing
hearing at the time of his original sentencing”); State v. Delgado, 151 A.3d 345,
352 (Conn. 2016) (explaining that, under Miller, courts are only required to consider youth-related mitigation when imposing a sentence of life without parole);
State ex rel. Jenkins v. State, 2017-0302, p. 1 (La. 8/31/18), 252 So. 3d 476, 476
(concluding that no resentencing necessary because parole eligibility remedies
any Miller violation); Manley v. State, No. 63120, 2016 WL 1335379, at *1 (Nev.
Apr. 1, 2016) (concluding that providing parole eligibility during petitioner’s lifetime satisfies the relief afforded by Miller); Stevens v. State, 422 P.3d 741, 750–51
(Okla. Crim. App. 2018) (implicitly determining in post-conviction proceeding that
if the State agrees to sentence with parole eligibility, resentencing is not required);
State v. Scott, 416 P.3d 1182, 1187 (Wash. 2018) (relying on Montgomery, concluding that “the Washington Miller fix statute’s parole provision cures the Miller
violation in Scott’s case”).
87
Graham, 560 U.S. at 75.
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II
THE TRADITIONAL UNDERSTANDING OF PAROLE AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF PAROLE DECISIONS
A. Parole as a Discretionary, Subjective Determination
Parole emerged in the United States as a way “to encourage
good behavior and to foster rehabilitation.”88 The earliest
American experiment with parole dates to 1876 when administrators at the Elmira Reformatory in New York rewarded resident juveniles and young adults for good behavior with
movement through progressive classification grades.89 Release
to the community—under supervision of the institution’s authorities—was possible upon demonstrating continued good
behavior in the first classification.90 Beginning in the early
twentieth century, states started to adopt indeterminate sentencing and parole regimes, and by 1942 every state and the
federal government operated under such a scheme.91 These
new systems allowed parole boards to determine when prisoners should be released from incarceration, while at the same
time providing incentives for prisoners to “earn” early release.92
Parole was considered a matter of “special expertise,” involving
“release under supervision at a time that maximizes both the
protection of the public and the individual’s rehabilitation.”93
Though, in practice, parole often operated more as a system for
reducing prison overcrowding and prisoner violence than as a
system designed to encourage rehabilitation.94 At the peak of
parole’s ubiquity in 1977, seventy-two percent of U.S. prisoners who were released from prison were released on parole.95
A sea change came in the late 1970s, when critics challenged indeterminate sentencing and parole release as inconsistent, discriminatory, and ineffectual at reducing
recidivism.96 Scholars advocated for a system with less focus
on rehabilitation, which they argued was ineffective, and with
88
Kimberly Thomas & Paul Reingold, From Grace to Grids: Rethinking Due
Process Protection for Parole, 107 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 213, 217 (2017).
89
See Joan Petersilia, Parole and Prisoner Reentry in the United States, 26
CRIME & JUST. 479, 488–89 (1999).
90
See id.
91
See id. at 489.
92
Thomas & Reingold, supra note 88, at 217–18.
93
Jon O. Newman, William J. Genego, Peter D. Goldberger, & Vicki C. Jackson, Parole Release Decisionmaking and the Sentencing Process, 84 YALE L.J. 810,
815 (1975) [hereinafter Parole Release Decisionmaking].
94
See Petersilia, supra note 89, at 490.
95
See id. at 489.
96
See id. at 492–93; Parole Release Decisionmaking, supra note 93, at 816.

R

R
R
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less parole board discretion, which they claimed led to disparities in sentencing among people convicted of the same offenses.97 Between 1976 and 1999, seventeen states entirely
eliminated discretionary parole release.98 This change was accompanied by a move towards determinate sentencing and
97

See Petersilia, supra note 89, at 494.
Arizona abolished parole for offenses committed on or after January 1,
1994, but reinstated parole for people who committed crimes as children.
S.B. 1049, 41st Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 1993); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-716 (2014) (asserting that a person sentenced to life imprisonment with the
possibility of release for an offense committed before the person was eighteen
years old is eligible for parole after reaching the minimum sentence “regardless of
whether the offense was committed on or after January 1, 1994”); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 41-1604.09 (2019) (providing that parole eligibility certification applies to
“a person who commits a felony offense before January 1, 1994” and to a person
“who is eligible for parole pursuant to § 13-716”). Delaware abolished parole for
offenses committed after 1990. Del. Admin. Code Par 2 (2020) (Uncodified). Florida abolished parole for offenses committed after 1983. See Release Types: Parole, FLA. COMMISSION ON OFFENDER REV., https://www.fcor.state.fl.us/releasetypes.shtml [https://perma.cc/2R7B-EKHP] (last visited Sept. 16, 2020). Illinois
abolished parole in 1978. See 38 ILL. COMP. STAT. 730/3-3-3(b) (2020). Indiana
abolished parole for offenses committed after October 1977. See Indiana Parole
Board, IND. DEP’T CORRECTION, https://www.in.gov/idoc/parole-services/paroleboard/ [https://perma.cc/U6KS-8Q4P] (last visited Sept. 16, 2020). Kansas
abolished parole for those offenses committed on or after July 1, 1993. KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 22-3717(d)(1) (2020). Maine abolished discretionary parole in 1976. ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-A, § 5801 (1983). Minnesota abolished its discretionary
parole system in 1980. See MINN. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, CORRECTIONS RETROSPECTIVE 1959–1999, at 12 (1999), https://mn.gov/doc/assets/docretro_tcm1089276272.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z9NL-KDCE] (last visited Oct. 17, 2020). North
Carolina does not have parole for crimes that occurred after 1994. An Act to
Provide for Structured Sentencing in North Carolina, 1993 N.C. Sess. Laws 2298,
2336. Ohio does not have discretionary parole for offenses committed on or after
July 1, 1996. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2967.13 (West 2020). Oregon abolished
discretionary parole for offenses committed after November 1, 1989. OR. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 144.050 (West 2020). In 2019 Oregon reinstated parole for people
who were under age eighteen at the time of the crime. S.B. 1008, 80th Legis.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2019). Virginia abolished discretionary parole in 1995
and currently has a system of geriatric parole for prisoners over age sixty.
S.B. 3001, 1994 Gen. Assemb., 2d Spec. Sess. (Va. 1994); see also VA. CODE ANN.
§ 53.1-40.01 (2020) (providing means for incarcerated people older than sixty to
obtain parole). Virginia also reinstated parole for people who were under age
eighteen at the time of the crime. H.B. 35, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va.
2020). Washington does not have parole for crimes committed after 1984 except
in the cases of people who were under age eighteen at the time of the crime and for
people convicted of certain sex offenses that occurred on or after September 1,
2001. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9.94A.730, 9.95.110–9.95.116, 9.95.190 (West
2020). Wisconsin abolished parole for crimes committed after 1999. See Parole
Information, ST. WIS. DEP’T CORRECTIONS, https://doc.wi.gov/Pages/VictimServices/ParoleInformation.aspx [https://perma.cc/84D3-QDXU] (last visited
Oct. 17, 2020). I am also counting Connecticut, Colorado, and Mississippi, which
abolished discretionary parole but later reinstated it for at least some offenses.
See Andres F. Rengifo & Don Stemen, The Unintended Effects of Penal Reform:
African American Presence, Incarceration, and the Abolition of Discretionary Parole
in the United States, 61 CRIME & DELINQ. 719, 736 (2012).
98

R
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longer prison terms.99 All states now operate with mandatory
minimum sentencing schemes, and most states require people
convicted of violent offenses to serve eighty-five percent of their
sentence in prison, limiting the discretion of the parole
boards.100
Currently, forty states101 have some form of discretionary
parole available for at least some people.102 Discretionary parole release still accounts for at least thirty percent of all prison
releases in 2012.103 Efforts to limit inconsistent parole decisions persist: most modern parole boards rely on guidelines or
other decision-making tools in making release decisions.104
The board’s inquiry generally focuses on the parole applicant’s
dangerousness should they be released.105
Traditionally, courts have understood parole as a discretionary, subjective, equity-like process. It has been termed “an
act of grace.”106 In its 1979 Greenholtz decision, the Supreme
99

See Petersilia, supra note 89, at 494.
See id. at 497.
101
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
102
I am including in this count states that only have parole eligibility for
people who were under eighteen years old at the time of the crime. Those states
are Arizona, Oregon, Virginia, and Washington (in addition to having parole eligibility for people who were juveniles at the time of the offense, Washington also
excepts people convicted of certain sex offenses that occurred after 2001 from its
post-1984 parole ban). I am also including states that seriously limit discretionary parole eligibility based on the offense of conviction. These states are California
and New Mexico. New Mexico has not had discretionary parole since 1979 except
for prisoners serving life sentences. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-21-10(A) (West 2020).
Similarly, California limits discretionary parole consideration to individuals sentenced to indeterminate life in prison and for a few other specified offenses. CAL.
PENAL CODE § 3046 (West 2020).
103
See E. ANN CARSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE: BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
PRISONERS IN 2018, at 13 (2020), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p18.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NC26-JQX6] (showing 614,844 prisoners released in 2018
from state and federal facilities); DANIELLE KAEBLE & MARIEL ALPER, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE: BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES,
2017–2018, at 23 (2020), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ppus1718.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MJ55-Q9ZA] (showing 192,296 discretionary parole releases
in 2018 from state and federal facilities); see also Thomas & Reingold, supra note
88, at 239 (“Discretionary release by parole boards still accounts for at least onethird and possibly close to half of all prison releases.”).
104
See Thomas & Reingold, supra note 88, at 242.
105
See Richard A. Bierschbach, Proportionality and Parole, 160 U. PA. L. REV.
1745, 1751 (2012).
106
See, e.g., Daniel S. Medwed, The Innocent Prisoner’s Dilemma: Consequences of Failing to Admit Guilt at Parole Hearings, 93 IOWA L. REV. 491, 493

R

100

R
R
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Court explained that states may provide parole but are not
obliged to do so.107 The Court described parole as a system in
which “few certainties exist” and in which “the choice involves a
synthesis of record facts and personal observation filtered
through the experience of the decisionmaker and leading to a
predictive judgment as to what is best both for the individual
inmate and for the community.”108 In other words, the Court
understood that the parole determination depends very much
on the subjective assessments of the individual board members. Such subjectivity and lack of certainty about the parole
process results in few guarantees about outcomes. Indeed, the
Court emphasized that “[t]here is no constitutional or inherent
right of a convicted person to be conditionally released before
the expiration of a valid sentence.”109 Parole is an “‘equity’ type
judgment that cannot always be articulated in traditional
findings.”110
In Greenholtz, the Court addressed whether the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause applies to parole release decisions. Nebraska prisoners who had been denied parole filed a
§ 1983 class action alleging that the parole board’s procedures
violated due process requirements.111 The question was
whether individuals appearing before the Nebraska parole
board have a liberty interest in parole that would trigger a due
process analysis. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
had found that prisoners seeking parole had a liberty interest
akin to the liberty interest held in Morrissey v. Brewer112 to be
at stake in parole revocation decisions.113 The Supreme Court
reversed. Parole revocation decisions, the Court explained, involve a deprivation of liberty that discretionary parole decisions
do not.114
In reaching this decision, the Court highlighted the contrasts between discretionary parole and parole revocation decisions. These distinctions centered on the idea that parole is
more subjective and that, generally speaking, there is nothing a
(2008) (“The granting of parole in the criminal justice system is often viewed as an
act of grace: the dispensation of mercy by the government to an individual prisoner deemed worthy of conditional release prior to the expiration of his
sentence.”).
107
Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979).
108
Id. at 8.
109
Id. at 7.
110
Id. at 8.
111
Id. at 3–4.
112
408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972).
113
Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 5–6, 16.
114
Id. at 9.
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parole applicant can prove that would require he be released.115 The protections required at parole revocation hearings are necessary to ensure that revocation determinations
are “based on verified facts” and “an accurate knowledge of the
parolee’s behavior.”116 By contrast, “the possibility of parole
provides no more than a mere hope that the benefit will be
obtained,” and such hope, the Court held, falls outside the
protections of due process.117 In so holding, the Court relied
on the subjective, discretionary nature of the parole decisionmaking process. The parole determination, the Court explained, “is more subtle” and depends on many “purely subjective appraisals by the Board members based upon their
experience with the difficult and sensitive task of evaluating
the advisability of parole release.”118 “The decision turns on a
‘discretionary assessment of a multiplicity of imponderables,
entailing primarily what a man is and what he may become
rather than simply what he has done.’”119 Unlike revocation,
“there is no set of facts which, if shown, mandate a decision
favorable to the individual.”120
The Greenholtz description and evaluation of the nature of
parole has endured in courts’ current analyses. Because parole has been understood as a wholly discretionary assessment
entrusted to the wisdom of the parole board, courts have been
reluctant to interfere with the boards’ determinations.121 As
David Ball wrote, “a parole board is free to deny parole for
whatever reason, on whatever facts, for however long.”122 The
next subpart analyzes the standards of review for parole denials in all fifty states. While the analysis does not quite bear out
that boards can deny parole for any reason, reviewing courts do
impose few restrictions on the manner of and reasons for parole denial.
B. Judicial Review of Traditional Parole Release Decisions
Access to judicial review of a parole board’s decision and
the standard for the court’s review vary across states. Informa115

See id. at 9–10.
Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 484.
117
Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11.
118
Id. at 9–10.
119
Id. at 10 (quoting Sanford H. Kadish, The Advocate and the Expert—Counsel in the Peno-Correctional Process, 45 MINN. L. REV. 803, 813 (1961)).
120
Id.
121
See infra subpart II.B.
122
W. David Ball, Heinous, Atrocious, and Cruel: Apprendi, Indeterminate Sentencing, and the Meaning of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 893, 944 (2009).
116
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tion about these standards has not been compiled elsewhere.
This subpart presents an overview—relying on state statutes,
regulations, and caselaw—of the standards of review of parole
board decisions in all fifty states. The Table in the Appendix
contains a full description of the states’ parole systems, mechanisms for review, and standards for judicial oversight of parole
board determinations.123
Twenty-seven states exempt parole determinations from
judicial review or severely limit the scope of review.124 Of that
number, eight states appear to entirely prohibit review.125 The
other nineteen states allow review only for constitutional
claims; claims that the parole board’s decision violated the governing statute, relevant regulations, or procedural due process
requirements; or some combination thereof.126
The cases holding that parole board decisions are not at all
subject to judicial review reflect the traditional understanding
of parole as an act of grace, a privilege, and a decision left
entirely to the discretion of the parole board. The Colorado
Supreme Court, for example, in addressing whether a prisoner
can seek judicial review of a parole denial, explained, “The
decision of the Board to grant or deny parole is clearly discretionary since parole is ‘a privilege, and no prisoner is entitled to
123
The Robina Institute’s Profiles in Parole Release and Revocation provided a
helpful starting point. Profiles in Parole Release & Revocation, ROBINA INST. CRIM.
L. & CRIM. JUST., https://robinainstitute.umn.edu/areas-expertise/paroleprofiles [https://perma.cc/L7EV-2RL5] (last visited Sept. 20, 2020).
124
Those states are Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming. In
Michigan, appeal of a parole board’s decision is only allowed by the prosecutor or
crime victim, so I have counted this as a state prohibiting the parole applicant
from appealing the parole decision. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 791.234(11)
(West 2020); Morales v. Mich. Parole Bd., 676 N.W.2d 221, 227 (Mich. Ct. App.
2003).
125
Colorado, Illinois, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South
Dakota, and Wyoming prohibit judicial review of parole board determinations.
See Table in Appendix.
126
For example, Arkansas precludes judicial review of an administrative adjudication regarding a prisoner but will review a prisoner’s parole decision if the
complaint asserts an infringement of constitutional rights. See ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 25-15-212(a) (West 2020). Delaware courts review parole decisions only to determine whether the board followed the governing statutes and regulations. See
Bradley v. Del. Parole Bd., 460 A.2d 532, 534 (Del. 1983). In Indiana, the courts
review parole decisions only for procedural due process compliance and to determine whether the board acted within the scope of its own powers. See Murphy v.
Ind. Parole Bd., 397 N.E.2d 259, 261 (Ind. 1979). Utah courts will only review the
process by which the court reaches its decision but not the decision itself. See
Preece v. House, 886 P.2d 508, 512 (Utah 1994).

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\106-5\CRN501.txt

1196

unknown

Seq: 24

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

1-SEP-21

13:45

[Vol. 106:1173

it as a matter of right.’”127 A Pennsylvania court explained,
“[p]arole is nothing more than a possibility, and, when granted,
it is nothing more than a favor granted upon a prisoner by the
state as a matter of grace and mercy.”128
An Illinois case denying review of a parole denial provides a
useful illustration of a court’s deference to the parole board’s
entirely discretionary decision. In Hanrahan v. Williams, the
Illinois Supreme Court examined Homer Hanrahan’s challenge
to his parole denial.129 Hanrahan was convicted of murder,
aggravated kidnapping, aggravated battery, and conspiracy
and was sentenced to 50 to100 years in prison.130 After being
denied parole, Hanrahan filed a complaint alleging, in part,
that the denial “was ‘arbitrary and capricious, [and] an abuse of
discretion[.]’ ”131 The court, summarizing Illinois’ parole
scheme, noted that there were no conditions under which the
board must grant parole.132 The court invoked the Greenholtz
characterization of parole as a “purely subjective appraisal.”133
As the court explained, “The Board is free to consider any available relevant information” in making its decision.134 For these
reasons, the court determined that there were no sufficiently
objective criteria on which it could evaluate the parole board’s
decision and therefore that the legislature must have intended
the parole board to have complete discretion.135 The court held
it could not review the board’s decision.136
Among the states that allow review only for constitutional
claims, procedural due process issues, or statutory or regulatory violations, the decisions reflect a similar understanding of
the “almost absolute discretion” of the parole board.137 For
example, the Indiana Supreme Court has explained that its
courts “cannot act as a ‘Super-Parole Board.’”138 However, the
courts have required “judicial review be available to insure [sic]
that the requirements of Due Process have been met and that
127
In re Question Concerning State Judicial Review of Parole Denial Certified
by U.S. Court of Appeals for Tenth Circuit, 610 P.2d 1340, 1341 (Colo. 1980)
(quoting Silva v. People, 407 P.2d 38, 39 (1965)).
128
Weaver v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 688 A.2d 766, 770 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1997).
129
673 N.E.2d 251, 252 (Ill. 1996).
130
Id.
131
Id. at 253.
132
Id. at 255.
133
Id. at 256.
134
Id. at 255.
135
Id.
136
Id. at 257.
137
See Holland v. Rizzo, 872 N.E.2d 659, 663 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
138
Murphy v. Ind. Parole Bd., 397 N.E.2d 259, 261 (Ind. 1979).
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the Parole Board has acted within the scope of its powers.”139
Thus, Indiana courts have entertained claims that parole applicants were not provided with sufficient notice of the reasons for
denial or that the board did not consider all relevant information in reaching its decision but will not review the actual decision of the parole board.140 The Kentucky Appellate Court has
similarly described parole as “a matter of legislative grace” with
which the courts will not interfere except to assess whether the
board complied with the requirements of due process.141 Other
states have recognized narrow jurisdiction to review constitutional claims, like race discrimination or retaliation for First
Amendment activities, even where review of parole board decisions is otherwise prohibited or narrowly proscribed.142
Even in the states that do allow judicial review of the parole
board’s decision for more than procedural or constitutional
compliance, review remains highly deferential to the board.
Twenty-two states provide for general review of the parole
board’s decision under some variation of an arbitrary and capricious or abuse of discretion standard.143 In these states,
decisions of reviewing courts generally reflect an understanding that parole is a subjective process best left to the discretion
139

Id.
See id.; see also Holleman v. State, 27 N.E.3d 344, 346 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015)
(noting the limited nature of the court’s review).
141
Belcher v. Ky. Parole Bd., 917 S.W.2d 584, 587 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996) (noting
that Kentucky’s parole statute does not create a liberty interest but acknowledging Belcher’s “legitimate interest in a decision rendered in conformity with the
established procedures and policies”).
142
See, e.g., Mangum v. Miss. Parole Bd., 76 So. 3d 762, 768 (Miss. Ct. App.
2011) (noting that while the parole board has “absolute discretion . . . where
constitutional issues are raised, a trial court asserts jurisdiction over those
claims”); Cooper v. Mo. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 866 S.W.2d 135, 137 (Mo. Ct. App.
1993) (en banc) (addressing prisoner’s claim that denial of parole violated the
Equal Protection Clause); Woodson v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., No. 02AP-393,
2002 WL 31722278, *2 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002) (“Because appellant does not allege
that his parole was denied for a constitutionally impermissible reason, the OAPA’s
decision to deny parole is not subject to judicial review . . . .”).
143
Those states are Alabama, Alaska, California, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii,
Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Washington,
West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See Table in Appendix. Maine is missing from the
total count in this subpart. In that state, which abolished parole in 1976, the
courts have recognized a right to petition for post-conviction review of a parole
board’s decision but the standard of review is unclear. See, e.g., Mahaney v.
State, 610 A.2d 738, 741 (Me. 1992) (placing the burden on the petitioner to prove
the defect claimed as well as prejudice); Fernald v. Me. State Parole Bd., 447 A.2d
1236, 1239 (Me. 1982) (holding the post-conviction review statute is the “exclusive mode of review of the matters that it covers,” which include parole board
release decisions, without clarifying the standard of review).
140
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of the parole board unless the board acts so far outside the
bounds of its authority that the courts must step in.
New York provides an example of the common reluctance
to interfere with the parole board’s discretion. As that state’s
highest court explained, “To require the Parole Commission to
act in accordance with judicial expectations, would substantially undermine the congressional decision to entrust release
determinations to the Commission and not the courts.”144 New
York courts have interpreted the arbitrary and capricious standard as warranting judicial intervention “only when there is a
‘showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety.’”145 This
standard has meant that reviewing courts afford the board a
great deal of deference.146 For example, in one case, the appellate court concluded that the board had properly denied parole
to a “model prisoner” based on the failure of the prisoner, who
maintained his innocence, to demonstrate remorse.147 The
court explained that in many cases New York courts have
“reached the same result, on the same basis, when reviewing
denials of parole to petitioners whom we recognized as having
exemplary records and as being compelling candidates for release.”148 In other instances New York courts have affirmed the
Board’s decision to “place a greater emphasis on the gravity of
[the] crime,” so long as the board considered all statutorily
required factors.149 Courts have also upheld parole board’s
decisions where the determinations were based on public or
political pressure to “get tough” on people who committed violent offenses.150 In sum, as long as the parole board demonstrates consideration of statutorily required factors, New York
courts are loath to second-guess the board’s decision. Many
other courts that provide some substantive review of parole
board decisions are similarly wary.151
144

In re Russo v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 405 N.E.2d 225, 228 (N.Y. 1980).
In re Silmon v. Travis, 741 N.E.2d 501, 504 (N.Y. 2000) (quoting In re
Russo, 405 N.E.2d at 229).
146
See id. at 504–05.
147
In re Hamilton v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714, 717 (App. Div.
2014).
148
Id. at 718 (listing decisions upholding parole denial despite model institutional records).
149
Id. at 717–18 (alteration in original) (listing decisions upholding denial
based on giving greater weight to the seriousness of the crime).
150
See Robles v. Dennison, 745 F. Supp. 2d 244, 278 (W.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d,
449 F. App’x 51 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing decisions upholding parole denials resulting
from public pressure).
151
See, e.g., Justice v. State Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 218 S.E.2d 45, 46 (Ga.
1975) (finding that the parole board members as public officers have absolute
discretion unless there is gross abuse); Ybarra v. Dermitt, 657 P.2d 14, 15 (Idaho
145
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Graham, Miller, and Montgomery provide reason to question this traditional understanding of parole and of the court’s
role with regard to parole release determinations. With those
decisions, the Supreme Court announced that parole is something more than a “discretionary assessment of a multiplicity of
imponderables”;152 parole is a mechanism that converts an unconstitutional sentence that condemns a juvenile to die in
prison into a sentence that complies with Eighth Amendment
proportionality principles.
III

GRAHAM, MILLER, MONTGOMERY, AND THE CHANGING
NATURE OF THE PAROLE DETERMINATION
A. The Constitutional Interest in the Parole Board’s
Decision
The Court’s recent trilogy of juvenile sentencing cases, Graham, Miller, and Montgomery, works to constitutionalize juvenile parole hearings. Graham set the stage with its
proclamation that the State must “give defendants like Graham
some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on
demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”153 The Court explained that its categorical rule prohibiting life without parole
for juveniles convicted of nonhomicide offenses gives those individuals “a chance to demonstrate maturity and reform” while
life without parole “gives no chance for fulfillment outside
prison walls, no chance for reconciliation with society, no
hope.”154 The Eighth Amendment problem with Mr. Graham’s
sentence, the Court asserted, is that the “State has denied him
any chance to later demonstrate that he is fit to rejoin society
based solely on a nonhomicide crime that he committed while
he was a child in the eyes of the law.”155 The Court emphasized
the role that parole plays in differentiating between a constitutional sentence and an unconstitutional one: parole provides a
1983) (concluding that a “court may not substitute its judgment for that of the
Board” and that the scope of review is limited to determining whether there is a
“sufficient . . . factual basis” for denial); Kelsey v. State, 283 N.W.2d 892, 894
(Minn. 1979) (stating that traditionally parole was an “act of grace” not subject to
judicial review but courts can ensure “legal adequacy of procedures followed” in
denying parole); Bussiere v. Cunningham, 571 A.2d 908, 912 (N.H. 1990) (explaining that parole board’s decision “must stand if it is supported by a ‘modicum
of evidence’” (quoting Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985))).
152
Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 10 (1979)
(quoting Kadish, supra note 119, at 813).
153
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010).
154
Id. at 79.
155
Id.

R
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“meaningful opportunity to obtain release,” a chance for life
outside of prison.156 Without such a chance, the Eighth
Amendment forbids a sentence of life in prison for a juvenile
convicted of a nonhomicide offense.157
Graham’s categorical bar on life without parole sentences
applied only to juveniles convicted of nonhomicide crimes, but
Miller made clear that what Graham said about children was
not “crime-specific”; rather, the Court’s reasoning “implicates
any life-without-parole sentence imposed on a juvenile.”158
The Court asserted that appropriate circumstances for the imposition of a life without parole sentence “will be uncommon,”
particularly because of the difficulty in differentiating the individual “whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects
irreparable corruption.”159
Montgomery completed the circle, explicitly bringing the
parole release decision into the realm of the Eighth Amendment. The Court first held that Miller announced a substantive
rule that “life without parole [is] an unconstitutional penalty
for . . . juvenile offenders whose crimes reflect the transient
immaturity of youth.”160 The Court explained:
Miller drew a line between children whose crimes reflect transient immaturity and those rare children whose crimes reflect irreparable corruption. The fact that life without parole
could be a proportionate sentence for the latter kind of juvenile offender does not mean that all other children imprisoned under a disproportionate sentence have not suffered the
deprivation of a substantive right.161

The Court made clear that for children whose crimes reflect
transient immaturity, a sentence of life without parole is a
disproportionate sentence. Serving such a sentence deprives
this category of individuals who committed offenses as
juveniles—”the vast majority of juvenile offenders”162— of a
substantive, Eighth Amendment right.
The Court reassured states that they could remedy a Miller
violation by giving people whose youth was not considered at
sentencing an opportunity for parole.163 This would ensure,
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163

Id. at 75.
See id.
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 473, 501 (2012).
Id. at 479–80 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005)).
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 734 (2016).
Id.
Id. at 736.
Id.
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the Court asserted, “that juveniles whose crimes reflected only
transient immaturity—and who have since matured—will not
be forced to serve a disproportionate sentence in violation of
the Eighth Amendment.”164 By sanctioning the use of a parole
hearing to remedy this violation, the Court placed in the hands
of the parole board the task of vindicating an individual’s substantive, Eighth Amendment right to a proportionate sentence
under Miller and Montgomery. Parole is what transforms a life
sentence for someone who was a juvenile at the time of the
crime into a constitutional sentence. Without parole, the life
sentence is unconstitutional. With it, the sentence passes constitutional muster.165
In Jones the Court seemingly backed away from the proportionality language in Miller and Montgomery, repudiating
Miller’s substantive requirements.166 Yet, Jones says very little
about parole or what ought to happen after sentencing. The
decision is squarely focused on the process required for a
front–end sentencing determination.167 The crucial point for
the Jones Court was that the sentencer have discretion to consider youth.168 The Court did not address the substantive determination that a certain category of punishment was
unconstitutional for a category of defendants; it addressed “the
precise question before [the Court]”, i.e. whether Miller requires
a finding of permanent incorrigibility before a sentencer may
impose life without parole.169
164

Id.
See also Kristen Bell, A Stone of Hope: Legal and Empirical Analysis of
California Juvenile Lifer Parole Decisions, 54 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 455, 458–59
(2019) (describing how the “task of providing the constitutionally required ‘meaningful opportunity to obtain release’ has [ ] been passed into the hands of parole
boards”); Laura Cohen, Freedom’s Road: Youth, Parole, and the Promise of Miller v.
Alabama and Graham v. Florida, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1031, 1058–59 (2014) (critically evaluating the assumption that parole eligibility in and of itself renders an
invalid sentence constitutional); Matthew Drecun, Note, Cruel and Unusual Parole, 95 TEX. L. REV. 707, 728–29 (2017) (analyzing cases interpreting Graham and
finding that Graham creates new standards for parole boards that, if not met, can
turn a constitutional life with parole sentence into an unconstitutional sentence
that is the functional equivalent of life without parole); Sarah French Russell,
Review for Release: Juvenile Offenders, State Parole Practices, and the Eighth
Amendment, 89 IND. L.J. 373, 414 (2014) (explaining that “simply making juvenile
offenders eligible for parole under existing practices will not guarantee compliance
with Eighth Amendment requirements”).
166
See, e.g., Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1311, 1314 (explaining that Miller requires
“only that the sentencer follow a certain process” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Id. at 1317 (reducing Miller to a requirement for a “discretionary sentencing
procedure”).
167
Id.
168
Id. at 1313.
169
Id. at 1322.
165
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Jones has little if anything to say about a back–end determination of how long a person ought to serve in prison or what
might be required in a parole proceeding. Nor about what strictures might bind administrative, as opposed to judicial, decision–makers. Indeed, it leaves unanswered the question
whether the constitution demands something different when
an administrative body decides, years into a sentence, how
long someone who was a child at the time of the crime ought to
spend in prison. The Jones Court’s proclamation that a sentencer given discretion will reach the right decision170 leaves
unanswered what Miller and Montgomery mean for parole determinations. The question remains whether parole eligibility
alone is sufficient to transform an unconstitutional sentence
into a constitutional one or whether parole for people who were
children at the time of the crime must do something more.
B. A Hope of Release
Montgomery’s pronouncements—that parole consideration
“ensures that juveniles whose crimes reflected only transient
immaturity . . . will not be forced to serve a disproportionate
sentence,” and that “[t]he opportunity for release will be afforded to those who demonstrate . . . [they] are capable of
change,”171—reflect an understanding that juvenile parole applicants have an Eighth Amendment interest in the outcome of
their hearing. Without such an interpretation, these statements lose meaning.
Nevertheless, the Court’s words could be read to mean simply that someone who was under age eighteen at the time of the
crime has an interest in the hope of release. Under such a
reading, the individual has an interest in being afforded a parole hearing but not in the board’s ultimate decision. This
interpretation of the constitutional interest as one in the possibility of parole comes from language in Montgomery, and especially in Graham, describing the need to provide a chance at
release. The Montgomery Court stated that if an individual can
show that their crime did not reflect incorrigibility, then “hope
for some years of life outside prison walls must be restored.”172
The Graham Court meanwhile specified that the State was “not
required to guarantee eventual freedom” and that “[t]he Eighth
Amendment does not foreclose the possibility that persons convicted of nonhomicide crimes committed before adulthood will
170
171
172

Id. at 1318.
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736.
Id. at 737 (emphasis added).
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remain behind bars for life.”173 In other words, the Court
seemingly sanctioned the idea that some people will never be
granted parole.174 Indeed, the Massachusetts Supreme Court
picked up on this theme in its Diatchenko decision, emphasizing that the constitutional right of the juvenile parole applicant
“is not a guarantee of eventual release, but an entitlement to a
meaningful opportunity for such release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”175
Yet, to conclude from these statements that juvenile parole
applicants are entitled only to hope, to no more than a chance
at release, would belie the Court’s conclusion about people who
commit crimes as children: that the vast majority of them
should not be forced to die in prison.176 An interest only in the
possibility of parole would mean that someone who demonstrates that their crime was the result of transient immaturity
and that they have subsequently matured could still be forced
to serve a lifetime in prison. They could be given parole hearings, fulfilling the requirement for an opportunity to be released, but could be denied release and forced to serve life in
prison, regardless of evidence of rehabilitation.177 Reading the
Court’s decisions to require opportunities for parole with no
guarantee of actual release if the individual demonstrates maturity and reform would ignore Graham’s requirement of a
“meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”178 It would render empty
“Miller’s conclusion that the sentence of life without parole is
disproportionate for the vast majority of juvenile offenders.”179
And it would flout Montgomery’s promise that those individuals
will not be forced to serve a disproportionate sentence.180
Reducing these cases to a hope of release would also ignore
the Court’s underlying analysis. Graham does not require a
guarantee of release from prison. However, the Court reasoned
173

Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010).
As perhaps did the dissent in Jones, reasoning that Mr. Jones sought only
“the possibility of parole” and that he “recognizes that the parole board may
ultimately decide he must spend his entire life behind bars.” Jones, 141 S. Ct. at
1340 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
175
Diatchenko v. Dist. Att’y for Suffolk Dist., 27 N.E.3d 349, 365 (Mass. 2015)
(emphasis added).
176
See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736.
177
See Cohen, supra note 165, at 1062 (“The oft-illusory hope for release,
then, does not in and of itself ease the experiential severity of a life prison term.
Something more than ‘hope’ is necessary to render an otherwise disproportionate
sentence constitutional.”).
178
Graham, 560 U.S. at 75 (emphasis added).
179
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736.
180
Id.
174

R
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that a guarantee was not required because there might be some
small minority of people for whom life in prison is a proportionate punishment. As the Court explained, “[t]hose who commit
truly horrifying crimes as juveniles may turn out to be irredeemable, and thus deserving of incarceration for the duration
of their lives.”181 In other words, states need not guarantee
release to everyone because some very small number of
juveniles might turn out to be irredeemable. Yet, the Court’s
statement also assumes that those who are not irredeemable
are not deserving of incarceration for the rest of their lives. For
this reason, “a lifetime in prison is a disproportionate sentence
for all but the rarest of children . . . .”182
As the Court has repeatedly echoed from Roper to Montgomery, it is “the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects
irreparable corruption.”183 In Montgomery the Court warned,
“Miller’s conclusion that the sentence of life without parole is
disproportionate for the vast majority of juvenile offenders
raises a grave risk that many are being held in violation of the
Constitution.”184 If the constitutional violation is that the vast
majority of people who committed crimes as children are held
in prison in violation of the Eighth Amendment, a mere hope of
parole does not remedy that violation. Only release from prison
upon demonstration of subsequent maturity and reform would
satisfy the Court’s promise that parole can cure the unconstitutionality of a life sentence. Thus, for people who committed
crimes as children, the substance of the parole board’s decision—and not only the opportunity for release—assumes constitutional significance.
C. How the Eighth Amendment Interest in Parole Changes
the Nature of the Hearing
In the case of juvenile parole hearings, the parole board is
making a constitutional determination—a determination that
is meant to bring the sentence into compliance with the Eighth
Amendment. Without parole, a sentence of life in prison is
invalid for someone who was a child at the time of the crime.
With parole, the sentence becomes valid. Parole is performing
a constitutionalizing function that transforms the board’s deci181

Graham, 560 U.S. at 75.
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 726.
183
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005); Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at
726, 734; Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479–80 (2012); Graham, 560 U.S. at
68.
184
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736 (emphasis added).
182
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sion from a discretionary act of grace into a constitutionally
required consideration of maturity and rehabilitation.
In the context of juvenile parole hearings, the parole decision is no longer a purely subjective appraisal. Rather, there is
a “set of facts which, if shown, mandate a decision favorable to
the individual.”185 Demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation
must allow a prisoner to gain release from prison.186 Juvenile
parole applicants “whose crimes reflected only transient immaturity” and who show subsequent maturity cannot “be forced to
serve a disproportionate sentence.”187 A lifetime in prison is
disproportionate “for all but the rarest of children, those whose
crimes reflect ‘irreparable corruption.’”188 If a juvenile parole
applicant demonstrates that their crime was not the result of
irreparable corruption, that it was an indication of transient
immaturity, and that they have subsequently matured and rehabilitated, they cannot be denied parole and forced to spend
the rest of their life in prison.
The focus of the juvenile parole hearing will, then, be on
rehabilitation rather than on the nature of the underlying
crime, as is typical in most modern parole reviews. A parole
board’s determination often turns on an assessment of the seriousness of the offense and the parole applicant’s ability to live
in the community without violating the law.189 While the latter
consideration can map onto an understanding of rehabilitation
and reform, the former is a static understanding of the nature
of the crime that does not account for children’s heightened
capacity for rehabilitation.190 Focus on the offense emphasizes
retribution over rehabilitation. But Graham cautioned:
Society is entitled to impose severe sanctions . . . to express
its condemnation of the crime and to seek restoration of the
moral imbalance caused by the offense. But “[t]he heart of
185
Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 10
(1979).
186
See Graham, 560 U.S. at 75.
187
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736.
188
Id. at 726.
189
See Brown v. Precythe, No. 2:17-cv-04082-NKL, 2018 WL 4956519, at *9
(W.D. Mo. Oct. 12, 2018) (“All parole decisions must be attributed to one of two
concededly ‘barebones, boilerplate’ reasons: the seriousness of the offense or
inability to live and remain at liberty without aga in [sic] violating the law.”);
Hawkins v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 30 N.Y.S.3d 397, 398
(App. Div. 2016) (denying parole because release “would so deprecate the seriousness of [his] offense as to undermine respect for the law”).
190
See Sarah Russell, The Role of the Crime at Juvenile Parole Hearings: A
Response to Beth Caldwell’s Creating Meaningful Opportunities for Release, 41
HARBINGER 227, 231 (2016) (“[T]he severity of the crime should carry no weight in a
parole board’s release decision in juvenile cases.”).
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the retribution rationale is that a criminal sentence must be
directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal
offender.” And as Roper observed, “[w]hether viewed as an
attempt to express the community’s moral outrage or as an
attempt to right the balance for the wrong to the victim, the
case for retribution is not as strong with a minor as with an
adult.”191

Roper recognized the risk that the nature of the crime would
overwhelm youth-related mitigation. The Court explained,
“[a]n unacceptable likelihood exists that the brutality or coldblooded nature of any particular crime would overpower mitigating arguments based on youth as a matter of course, even
where the juvenile offender’s objective immaturity, vulnerability, and lack of true depravity should require a sentence less
severe than death.”192 Although Roper addressed the capital
context, Graham explicitly correlated juvenile life-without-parole sentences to the death penalty.193 Roper’s concern that a
brutal crime might overwhelm consideration of youth and redemptive capacity is just as apt in the context of life without
parole. Indeed, Miller’s “central intuition” was “that children
who commit even heinous crimes are capable of change.”194 A
parole board decision, then, that allows the seriousness of the
crime to trump considerations of change and rehabilitation
does not comport with the Supreme Court’s assessment that
the nature of the crime cannot overpower a youth’s lessened
culpability and greater capacity for change.
Instead, the juvenile parole process is intended to prioritize
rehabilitation. From its earliest iterations in this country, parole has been understood as “a regular part of the rehabilitative
process.”195 In Graham, the Court asserted that rehabilitation
is “a penological goal that forms the basis of parole systems.”196
This rehabilitative focus becomes central to the juvenile parole
hearing. Ignoring rehabilitation and “denying the defendant
the right to reenter the community” is “an irrevocable judgment
about that person’s value and place in society” that “is not
191

Graham, 560 U.S. at 71 (citation omitted).
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005).
193
Graham, 560 U.S. at 69.
194
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 724 (2016).
195
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 300 (1983); see also Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989) (“Both indeterminate sentencing and parole were
based on concepts of the offender’s possible, indeed probable, rehabilitation, a
view that it was realistic to attempt to rehabilitate the inmate and thereby to
minimize the risk that he would resume criminal activity upon his return to
society.”).
196
Graham, 560 U.S. at 73.
192
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appropriate in light of a juvenile[‘s] . . . capacity for change and
limited moral culpability.”197 The board cannot deny release in
its discretion if it finds the crime was the result of transient
immaturity and that the parole applicant has subsequently
matured.
Courts reviewing parole hearings post-Graham, Miller, and
Montgomery have recognized the constitutional nature of juvenile parole determinations. These decisions reveal an understanding that parole hearings for people who were children at
the time of their crimes require consideration different from
traditional parole hearings for incarcerated adults.
In Greiman v. Hodges, the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Iowa analyzed, in the context of a prisoner’s § 1983 claim, whether a parole hearing provided a
“meaningful opportunity for relief” under Graham.198 The Iowa
legislature had created parole eligibility after twenty-five years
in prison for people incarcerated for a Class A felony that occurred when they were younger than eighteen years old.199
The plaintiff, who was originally sentenced to life without parole, was resentenced under the new law to life with the possibility of parole.200 The parole board twice denied him parole
based on the seriousness of the crime, and the Plaintiff brought
a § 1983 action alleging that the board failed to provide a
meaningful opportunity for parole and to consider his youth,
demonstrated maturity, and rehabilitation.201 The parole
board (IBOP) filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiff
was claiming a right to an enhanced, “super” parole review
beyond the normal parole process, and that Graham is limited
to sentencing rather than parole considerations.202 The court
denied the IBOP’s motion to dismiss, explaining that an opportunity to prove that the plaintiff should be released before the
expiration of his life sentence could only reasonably exist during parole review.203 As the court elaborated:
[T]he ultimate length of Plaintiff’s prison sentence will be determined by the IBOP, because it alone has the authority to
grant Plaintiff release. . . . Thus . . . the responsibility for
197
Id. at 74. See Russell, supra note 190, at 231 (arguing that the focus of
juvenile parole hearings should be on whether the parole applicant has demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation).
198
79 F. Supp. 3d 933, 935–36 (S.D. Iowa 2015).
199
Id. at 935.
200
Id. at 935–36.
201
Id. at 936.
202
Id. at 942.
203
Id. at 943.
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ensuring that Plaintiff receives his constitutionally mandated
‘meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation’ lies squarely with [the
parole board] and the other State-actor Defendants.204

In rejecting the board’s argument, the court implicitly acknowledged that juvenile parole hearings do entail a sort of “super”
parole hearing that will differ from a normal parole proceeding.
Similarly, in Diatchenko v. District Attorney for Suffolk District, the Massachusetts Supreme Court reasoned that because
juvenile parole hearings have a constitutional dimension, they
must be accompanied by certain procedural protections.205 In
that case, juvenile parole applicants argued that, in order for
parole review to be meaningful, they must have access to counsel, expert witnesses, and an opportunity for judicial review of
the parole board’s decision.206 The court first determined that
“in light of the fact that the offender’s opportunity for release is
critical to the constitutionality of the sentence,” juvenile parole
applicants must have access to counsel, as well as to funds for
expert witnesses.207 The court then held that juvenile parole
hearings must be subject to judicial review. The court explained, “[T]he parole hearing acquires a constitutional dimension for a juvenile homicide offender because the availability of
a meaningful opportunity for release on parole is what makes
the juvenile’s mandatory life sentence constitutionally proportionate.”208 Therefore, the court must be allowed to ensure
that the “right of a juvenile homicide offender to a constitutionally proportionate sentence is not violated.”209
Greiman and Diatchenko reflect an analysis that the juvenile parole hearing serves a function different than a typical
adult parole hearing: the juvenile hearing provides the constitutionally required opportunity to demonstrate that the juvenile parole applicant should not be imprisoned for the rest of
their life.210 This constitutional function mandates standards
to ensure the parole applicants’ rights are vindicated.
204

Id.
27 N.E.3d 349, 369 (Mass. 2015).
206
Id. at 353.
207
Id. at 361.
208
Id. at 365.
209
Id.
210
See also Brown v. Precythe, No. 2:17-cv-04082-NKL, 2017 WL 4980872, at
*13 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 31, 2017) (denying motion to dismiss and granting leave to
amend). In that case, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri
considered whether Missouri’s parole procedures and practices for individuals
who were juveniles at the time of the offense violated the state and federal constitutions. Under the new law, the board was required to consider, among other
205
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D. Proposed Standard for Parole Board Review of Juvenile
Parole Hearings: Presumption of Release
Based on the Court’s reasoning in Graham, Miller, and
Montgomery, the parole board ought to presume maturity and
rehabilitation and, therefore, release for juvenile parole applicants.211 Only if the evidence establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the crime was not the result of transient
immaturity and that the parole applicant has not matured and
rehabilitated should the board deny release.
Such a standard comports with the understanding that for
the “vast majority” of people who committed crimes as children,
the crime will be the result of transient immaturity, and life in
prison would be a disproportionate punishment.212 Children,
the Court has determined, but for a few “incorrigible[s],” have a
unique “capacity for change.”213 In other words, a juvenile
parole applicant whose crime is not the result of transient immaturity and who has not subsequently matured and reformed
is the exception, not the rule. Given this understanding, it
does not make sense to task juvenile parole applicants with
proving that they are not the exception to the rule. The board
factors, the applicant’s rehabilitation, growth and maturity, and risk to society.
Id. at *3. The plaintiffs were denied parole at their initial hearings and scheduled
for a five-year setback. Id. at *1. Plaintiffs alleged that the new parole legislation
failed to provide the constitutionally required meaningful opportunity for release.
Id. at *6. The court rejected defendant’s motion to dismiss, relying on the alleged
facts that, inter alia, the board granted parole in only two of twenty hearings—
most denials cite only the seriousness of the offense, while plaintiffs’ “prison
records may show maturity and rehabilitation.” Id. at *10. The court thus acknowledged that a meaningful opportunity for release may require more than a
statutory requirement that the board consider growth and maturity.
211
Some scholars have suggested that presumptions, with certain limitations,
should apply to juvenile parole hearings. See Sarah Sloan, Note, Why Parole
Eligibility Isn’t Enough: What Roper, Graham, and Miller Mean for Juvenile Offenders and Parole, 47 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 243, 275–76 (2015) (arguing for a
presumption of release for juvenile parole applicants with exceptions for “objective, easily documented, and easily verified” circumstances, which would be statutorily enumerated, and could include a “major disciplinary infraction in the past
year,” “recent threats,” or failure to express remorse). See also Beth Caldwell,
Creating Meaningful Opportunities for Release: Graham, Miller and California’s
Youth Offender Parole Hearings, 40 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 245, 297 (2016)
(proposing that a presumption against current dangerousness could apply if a
parole applicant demonstrates their crime was the result of transient immaturity
or outside influence or that they have matured since the time of the crime);
Cohen, supra note 165, at 1087 (recommending a presumption of release on
parole upon completion of a minimum term and “if current dangerousness is not
established”).
212
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 734 (2016).
213
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 77 (2010).
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should give credit to the expectation, grounded in science214
and in the law, that the vast majority of people who were children at the time of the crime will rehabilitate.
A presumption of release would both work to ensure that
juvenile parole hearings meet the constitutional task set for
them, and to create a clear, workable standard for the parole
board to apply. The presumption would also give life to Montgomery’s promise that parole will ensure that those who have
matured “will not be forced to serve a disproportionate sentence,”215 in part by preventing blanket or knee-jerk denials,
and by setting a clear expectation that juvenile parole applicants should be granted parole in most circumstances. Such
an expectation is necessary to counteract boards’ reluctance to
grant release, particularly to individuals serving long sentences
for serious crimes.216 In addition, a presumption of release
gives the parole board a clear baseline from which to assess the
case before them, rather than requiring the board to weigh a
laundry list of factors in order to determine suitability for
release.
A few jurisdictions provide examples of a presumption of
release in practice. In 2014 the Washington State legislature
enacted changes to the state’s parole statutes, allowing individuals convicted of crimes committed before age eighteen to petition for early release after serving twenty years in prison.217
The legislation provides that the parole board “shall order the
person released . . . unless the board determines by a preponderance of the evidence that, despite such conditions, it is more
likely than not that the person will commit new criminal law
violations if released.”218 As the Washington Appellate Court
has explained, the legislation “expressly contemplates that the
offender will not serve more than 20 years of their sentence
214
See, e.g., Terrie E. Moffitt, Adolescent-Limited and Life-Course-Persistent
Antisocial Behavior: A Developmental Taxonomy, 100 PSYCHOL. REV. 674, 685–86,
690 (1993) (finding that the majority of teenagers who engage in delinquent activities engage in this antisocial behavior only temporarily during adolescence); Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence:
Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1014–15 (2003) (summarizing science that demonstrates that juveniles have a deficient capacity for decision-making, heightened
vulnerability to coercion, and less-developed characters).
215
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736.
216
See Sharon Dolovich, Creating the Permanent Prisoner, in LIFE WITHOUT
PAROLE: AMERICA’S NEW DEATH PENALTY? 96, 110–11 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. &
Austin Sarat eds., 2012).
217
S.B. 5064 § 10, 63rd Leg., 2014 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2014).
218
Id.
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unless they are likely to reoffend.”219 Colorado has also created a presumption in favor of parole for individuals who complete a recently enacted Department of Corrections program for
anyone convicted of a felony committed as a juvenile.220 The
program provides participants with “more independence in
daily life,” and requires employment and programming to “support the offender’s successful reintegration.”221 Anyone who
completes this program is eligible for early parole and, if they
have served at least twenty-five or thirty years in prison (depending on the crime), “it is presumed” that they have met the
requirements for a grant of parole. The presumed requirements are: 1) that there are “extraordinary mitigating circumstances,” and 2) that release “is compatible with the safety and
welfare of society.”222
California’s parole scheme operates under a presumption
of release for parole applicants regardless of their age at the
time of the crime. The governing statute provides that the
board “shall grant parole to an inmate unless it determines
that the gravity of the current convicted offense or offenses, or
the timing and gravity of current or past convicted offense or
offenses, is such that consideration of the public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration.”223 As the California Supreme Court has explained, “parole applicants in this
state have an expectation that they will be granted parole unless the Board finds, in the exercise of its discretion, that they
are unsuitable.”224 In other words, release on parole is “the
rule, rather than the exception.”225 The juvenile parole statute
219
In re Brashear, 430 P.3d 710, 715 (Wash. Ct. App. 2018), review granted
sub nom., 448 P.3d 764 (Wash. 2019) (emphasis omitted).
220
See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-34-102(8) (2020).
221
Id. § 17-34-102(2). This program appears to recognize what some advocates have urged: a meaningful opportunity for release must entail access to
meaningful opportunities to rehabilitate while in prison. See, e.g., Caldwell, supra
note 211, at 286–91 (2016) (arguing that access to rehabilitative programs in
prison is “fundamental” to providing a meaningful opportunity for release); Sally
Terry Green, Realistic Opportunity for Release Equals Rehabilitation: How the
States Must Provide Meaningful Opportunity for Release, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 1,
37 (2011) (arguing that the “meaningfulness” of the opportunity for release for
juveniles serving life in prison “is directly related to participation in whatever
rehabilitative programs are available”); Marsha L. Levick & Robert G. Schwartz,
Practical Implications of Miller and Jackson: Obtaining Relief in Court and Before
the Parole Board, 31 LAW & INEQ. 369, 393–401 (2013) (arguing that programing in
prison must be both available and meaningful for juveniles who are now eligible
for parole).
222
§ 17-34-102(7)–(8).
223
CAL. PENAL CODE § 3041(b)(1) (West 2020).
224
In re Rosenkrantz, 59 P.3d 174, 203 (Cal. 2002).
225
In re Hunter, 141 Cal. Rptr. 3d 350, 361 (Ct. App. 2012).
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incorporates this presumption of parole, and requires consideration of “the diminished culpability of youth,” “the hallmark
features of youth,” and “any subsequent growth and increased
maturity” in order to provide for “a meaningful opportunity to
obtain release.”226 Recent Board of Parole Hearings regulations more explicitly condition denial upon a finding that the
parole applicant’s current risk to public safety outweighs “the
youth offender factors.”227
These states provide examples of a presumption of release
for juvenile parole applicants, but two caveats bear emphasizing. First, given the constitutional right at stake, the evidence
required to rebut the presumption ought to be held to a higher
standard than some evidence or a preponderance of the evidence. Second, the evidence ought to be current and actually
reflective of the parole applicant’s lack of rehabilitation and
current danger to the public if released.
Because the parole applicant’s constitutional right to a
proportionate sentence is at stake, there should be a fairly high
threshold for the evidence that would overcome the presumption of release. The Supreme Court has explained, “The function of a standard of proof . . . is to ‘instruct the factfinder
concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he
should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a
particular type of adjudication.’”228 In this instance, given that
the parole board’s determination that the applicant has not
rehabilitated would mean precluding someone imprisoned as a
child from reentering society, the board ought to have a firm
conviction in the accuracy of such a determination. Further,
the standard of proof “serves to allocate the risk of error between the litigants and to indicate the relative importance attached to the ultimate decision.”229 Here, the risk to the State
is releasing someone who might not be rehabilitated and who
might commit another offense. The risk to the individual is
being forced to serve a lifetime in prison and to suffer a disproportionate sentence. A clear and convincing standard would
reflect the gravity of the interests at stake and reduce the risk
that an individual’s Eighth Amendment rights would be vio-

226

CAL. PENAL CODE § 3051(d)–(f) (West 2020).
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15 § 2445(d) (2020).
228
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427 (1979) (addressing the standard of
proof required in civil commitment hearings and determining that something
more than a preponderance of the evidence was necessary).
229
Id. at 423.
227
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lated.230 It would not set an unreasonably high barrier to finding a lack of rehabilitation, but would ensure that the
presumption of rehabilitation and release, based in science and
in the Court’s pronouncements, would not be overcome lightly.
Second, the requirement to overcome the presumption of
release should be focused on current evidence of the parole
applicant’s lack of rehabilitation. Broad assessment of potential risk to public safety—often the concern of parole
boards231 —ought not be the standard. Such emphasis
hazards being disconnected from current rehabilitation and
actual danger because of reliance on the underlying offense
and other static factors.232 For example, California’s general
parole statute allows the board to consider “the gravity of the
current convicted offense or offenses” in assessing whether the
presumption of parole should be overcome.233 Yet, as discussed in section III.C., supra, a parole decision based on a
crime committed decades earlier does not give credit to children’s capacity for change. And the underlying offense neither
speaks to whether the person has since rehabilitated, nor
whether they pose any current danger. As Professor Sarah
Russell has noted, the sentencing judge has already accounted
for the nature of the crime, and by the time of the parole hearing, “the sentence has served its retributive purpose, and the
relevant question should be whether the individual has demonstrated rehabilitation and can be safely released into society.”234 Nor do disciplinary violations from the individual’s
early years in prison reflect their current rehabilitation.235
230
This is the standard required by some states in parole or probation revocation hearings. See MINN. R. 27.04 (2020) (providing that revocation hearing is held
to determine whether “clear and convincing evidence of a probation violation
exists and whether probation should be revoked”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2267
(2016) (providing that violation of probation must be established by clear and
convincing evidence); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-123.63(d) (West 2020) (providing that
parole board may revoke parole if “there is clear and convincing evidence that a
parolee has violated the conditions of his parole”).
231
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 3041(b)(1) (West 2020) (providing for a presumption of release unless public safety requires continued incarceration); 61 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 6102 (2021) (requiring that the parole board shall “first and foremost seek to protect the safety of the public”); WASH. REV. CODE. § 9.95.009 (2011)
(emphasizing that public safety considerations should be given highest priority).
232
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 3041(b)(1) (West 2020) (providing that consideration of public safety is judged based on “gravity of the current convicted offense
or offenses”).
233
Id.
234
Russell, supra note 190, at 231.
235
See Attapol Kuanliang, Jon R. Sorensen & Mark D. Cunningham, Juvenile
Inmates in an Adult Prison System: Rates of Disciplinary Misconduct and Violence,
35 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 1186, 1196–97 (2008) (reporting that in a study of
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Further, assessment of potential risk based on static and unchangeable factors is problematic in its potentially racially disparate impact.236
As an example of a standard focused—at least in policy—
on the parole applicant’s current rehabilitation, California’s juvenile parole regulations require the board to grant parole unless the hearing panel determines that youth-related mitigation
is “outweighed by relevant and reliable evidence that the youth
offender remains a current, unreasonable risk to public
safety.”237 This focus on a “current, unreasonable risk” asks
the board to examine not decades old information, and not any
suggestion of potential risk, but rather reliable evidence of current danger.
A reliance on rehabilitation in juvenile parole determinations may be subject to the critique that it is too vague a benchmark to practically apply. As the Graham Court has noted,
“The concept of rehabilitation is imprecise.”238 Yet, a presumption of release would task the board with determining if someone has not rehabilitated, and it is a more practical standard to
assess what is not rehabilitation than what is. For example,
while an unremarkable institutional record with evidence of
neither good nor bad behavior might pose a difficulty in determining whether it demonstrates reform, such a record would
be uncomplicated with a presumption of release in place.
Meanwhile, evidence that an individual was recently convicted
for another criminal offense while in prison, or that they received recent disciplinary reports for serious misbehavior could
support a determination that someone has not, in fact,
reformed.
A robust standard for the parole board that sets a clear
expectation that the board should presume release would work
prisoners in a Florida institution, compared to older prisoners, juveniles were far
more likely to receive disciplinary violations, including for violent behavior); Margaret E. Leigey & Jessica P. Hodge, And Then They Behaved: Examining the
Institutional Misconduct of Adult Inmates Who Were Incarcerated as Juveniles, 93
PRISON J. 272, 285–86 (2013) (noting that, over time, individuals convicted as
juveniles become indistinguishable in terms of misconduct from individuals convicted as adults).
236
See Cecilia Klingele, The Promises and Perils of Evidence-Based Corrections, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 537, 561 (2015) (“Hunches about ‘risk’ are often
rooted in misinformation and subconscious biases about race, class, and culture
that often bear only passing resemblance to actual dangerousness.”); Bernard E.
Harcourt, Risk as a Proxy for Race: The Dangers of Risk Assessment, 27 FED.
SENT’G. REP. 237, 237 (2015) (risk assessment tools exacerbate racial disparities
in criminal justice system).
237
CAL. CODE. REGS. tit. 15 § 2445(d) (2020).
238
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 73 (2010).
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to ensure juvenile parole hearings meet their constitutional
task. Alone, however, it would not fulfill the Court’s promise
that those who demonstrate maturity and reform will not be
forced to spend their lives in prison. Parole boards are, as
described in section IV.A., infra, administrative bodies often
comprised of politically well-connected individuals with little
criminal justice experience. They are risk averse, and often
loath to grant parole, particularly in cases involving serious
crimes and long sentences.239 In some states parole grant
rates are as low as 0.5 percent, even for people who were under
age eighteen at the time of the offense, and grant rates are often
lower for serious offenses.240 Moreover, given the Court’s pronouncement that it is the rare, irreparably corrupt juvenile who
should be forced to spend their life in prison,241 any parole
denials should be carefully scrutinized. A meaningful opportunity for release must, therefore, include judicial review of the
parole board’s decisions.
IV
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF JUVENILE PAROLE DETERMINATIONS
A. The Case for Judicial Review
Juvenile parole hearings can serve as a filter that relieves
states of the task of resentencing every individual subject to life
without parole for an offense that occurred when they were
children. As Montgomery promised, states need not resentence
every person who has been sent to prison for life for a juvenile
offense.242 Parole boards, rather than courts, can take on the
heavy task of assessing the rehabilitation of juvenile parole
applicants. The boards may in many cases affirm Montgomery’s promise and grant parole to those who demonstrate maturity and rehabilitation. And a presumption of release would
help ensure that individuals who demonstrate their crime was
the result of transient immaturity are not subject to spend the
rest of their lives in prison. But judicial review should be available to assure that, if an individual’s Eighth Amendment right
to a proportionate sentence is not vindicated, the violation is
239

See Dolovich supra note 216, at 111–12.
SARAH MEHTA, ACLU, FALSE HOPE: HOW PAROLE SYSTEMS FAIL YOUTH SERVING
EXTREME SENTENCES 45–46, (2016) (citing, inter alia, Florida parole grant rates in
FY 2013-2014; Missouri 2015 grant rate of 81% generally compared to 29% for
individuals serving a juvenile life sentence; Maryland general grant rate of 40%
while no juvenile lifers have been granted parole in the past twenty years).
241
See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 734, 736–37 (2016).
242
Id. at 736.
240
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remedied. The courts, rather than an administrative agency,
should be the ultimate forum for determining whether there
has been a violation of a constitutional right.
Parole board members are typically political appointees
without legal experience. In most states, parole board members are appointed by the governor.243 For this reason, board
composition is shaped by the political process, and board
members tend to be politically well-connected.244 A minority of
states require that board members have experience in the criminal justice system or a related field.245 Nineteen states have
no baseline requirements for parole board membership.246 Parole systems responding to a recent Robina Institute Survey
counted 10% of members with a high school diploma as their
highest educational achievement, 38% of members with a
bachelor’s degree, and 21% with a juris doctorate.247 Information about parole board chairs in particular reflects that almost
20% have never worked in a criminal justice related field, almost half had been police, probation, or corrections officers,
about 20% were lawyers, and about 3% had been judges.248 In
short, parole board members are extremely unlikely to have a
background in constitutional law, are almost certainly unfamiliar with making constitutional determinations, and are not
likely to have experience with the criminal system.
The Court has recognized a strong presumption of judicial
review of agency actions.249 In the federal context, “judicial
review of a final agency action . . . will not be cut off unless
there is persuasive reason to believe that such was the purpose
of Congress,”250 or unless the action is committed by law to the
discretion of the agency.251 As described above, Graham,
243
EBONY L. RUHLAND, EDWARD E. RHINE, JASON P. ROBEY & KELLY LYN MITCHELL,
ROBINA INST. OF CRIM. L. & CRIM. J., THE CONTINUING LEVERAGE OF RELEASING AUTHORITIES : F INDINGS FROM A N ATIONAL S URVEY 18 (2017), https://robinainstitute.umn.edu/sites/robinainstitute.umn.edu/files/
final_national_parole_survey_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/BM7N-MAEE] [hereinafter ROBINA RELEASING AUTHORITIES SURVEY].
244
See Cohen, supra note 165, at 1072.
245
ROBINA RELEASING AUTHORITIES SURVEY, supra note 243, at 17.
246
Id.
247
Id. at 20.
248
JASON P. ROBEY & EDWARD E. RHINE, ROBINA INST. OF CRIM. L. & CRIM. J.,
PAROLE BOARD MEMBERS: STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS, EDUCATIONAL ACHIEVEMENTS, AND
INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE 3–4 (2017), https://robinainstitute.umn.edu/newsviews/parole-board-members-statutory-requirements-educational-achievements-and-institutional [https://perma.cc/HX3F-95AQ].
249
Abbott Labs v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967), abrogated by Califano v.
Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
250
Id.
251
5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2011).
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Miller, and Montgomery have changed the discretionary nature
of parole for juvenile parole hearings. No longer is the decision
committed to the agency’s discretion. Rather, the board is
making a determination about the proportionality of the parole
applicant’s sentence. Particularly where constitutional claims
are at stake, the Court is loath to “deny any judicial forum for a
colorable constitutional claim.”252
The Supreme Court has recognized the problem of leaving
the vindication of a constitutional right exclusively in the
hands of a non-judicial actor. In 1986, the plurality in Ford v.
Wainwright noted that the Court was aware of no circumstance
in which “the vindication of a constitutional right [is] entrusted
to the unreviewable discretion of an administrative tribunal.”253 In that case, the Court was tasked with determining
whether the Constitution forbids the execution of the insane.254 The Court held that such a practice ran afoul of the
Eighth Amendment.255
The plurality opinion addressed the sufficiency of Florida’s
procedures for assessing competency, including the Governor’s
final approval of the competency determination. Florida had
sentenced Alvin Ford to death in 1974.256 In 1982 he began to
show signs of serious mental disturbance: he became obsessed
with the Ku Klux Klan and was convinced that he was a target
of a conspiracy by them and others to force him to kill himself;
he believed that correctional officers were killing people and
hiding the bodies in prison beds; he thought that his female
relatives were being abused and tortured within the prison and
that his friends and family were being held hostage in the
prison; he wrote to the Attorney General of Florida to announce
that he had ended the hostage crisis and “reported having appointed nine new justices to the Florida Supreme Court.”257 A
psychiatrist hired by defense counsel found Ford suffered from
a disease that resembled paranoid schizophrenia, and another
doctor determined that Ford could not understand the connection between his crime and the death penalty—believing instead that he would not be executed because “he owned the
prisons and could control the Governor through mind
252
Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988) (holding that statute did not
preclude judicial review of respondent’s claims that termination of employment
violated his constitutional rights).
253
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 416 (1986).
254
Id. at 401.
255
Id. at 410.
256
Id. at 401
257
Id. at 402.
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waves.”258 Defense counsel initiated the state procedures for
determining whether Ford was competent.259 Under these procedures, three psychiatrists interviewed Ford together for a half
hour and filed three separate reports to the Governor. “One
doctor concluded that Ford suffered from ‘psychosis with paranoia’ but had ‘enough cognitive functioning to understand the
nature and the effects of the death penalty, and why it is to be
imposed on him’”; the second doctor concluded that Ford was
“psychotic” but knew “what can happen to him”; and the third
“concluded that Ford had a ‘severe adaptational disorder’, but
did ‘comprehend his total situation including being sentenced
to death,’ and that Ford’s disorder “seemed contrived.”260 According to Florida procedures, the governor had final decision
on the competency determination. He made his decision by
signing a warrant for Ford’s execution.261
It was this executive determination, without possibility of
judicial review, to which the plurality opinion objected. After
finding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits execution of a
prisoner who is insane, the Court addressed whether the district court was required to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine Ford’s sanity.262 The question hinged on whether the
state court trier of fact had held a full hearing and “reliably
found the relevant facts,” in which case a district court hearing
would not be required.263 The Court thus reviewed the adequacy of the state court procedures where a prisoner’s competency determination is conducted “wholly within the executive
branch.”264 The Court found that the procedures “fail[ed] to
achieve even the minimal degree of reliability required for the
protection of any constitutional interest.”265 In so concluding,
the Court found that “[p]erhaps the most striking defect” in the
procedures was “the placement of the decision wholly within
the executive branch.”266 The court noted that delay of execution on the grounds of insanity was not traditionally an executive decision: “Thus, history affords no better basis than does
logic for placing the final determination of a fact, critical to the
trigger of a constitutional limitation upon the State’s power, in
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 403.
at 404.
at 410.
(quoting Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312–13 (1963)).
at 412.
at 413.
at 416.
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the hands of the State’s own chief executive.”267 The Court
further asserted that this was an unprecedented case of shielding a constitutional decision from judicial review: “In no other
circumstance of which we are aware is the vindication of a
constitutional right entrusted to the unreviewable discretion of
an administrative tribunal.”268 The plurality concluded that
Florida’s competency review procedures were insufficient.
More recently, in the denial of certiorari in a case challenging the constitutionality of Ohio’s sentencing statute, Justice
Sotomayor echoed this concern about insulating sentencing
decisions from judicial review. In Campbell v. Ohio, Justice
Sotomayor, writing separately, warned that Ohio’s statute,
which precludes review of a sentence imposed for murder or
aggravated murder, “raises serious constitutional concerns.”269 She elaborated: “Trial judges making the determination whether a defendant should be condemned to die in prison
have a grave responsibility, and the fact that Ohio has set up a
scheme under which those determinations ‘cannot be reviewed’
is deeply concerning.”270 Justice Sotomayor noted the parallels the Court has drawn between the death penalty and life
without parole, and she reviewed the Court’s decisions emphasizing the role of meaningful appellate review in ensuring the
reliability of death sentences.271 In those cases, the Court
stressed that appellate review “promotes reliability and consistency,”272 and ensures the penalty “is not imposed arbitrarily[,] . . . irrationally,”273 or “capriciously.”274 While the Justice
determined that the present case did not present the appropriate opportunity to address the issue of reviewability, she cautioned the Ohio courts to “be vigilant” in considering this
question in the right case.275
As with the Eighth Amendment right at issue in Wainwright, the vindication of a parole applicant’s constitutional
267

Id.
Id.
269
138 S. Ct. 1059, 1059 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in denial of
certiorari).
270
Id.
271
Id. at 1060.
272
Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 749 (1990).
273
Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308, 321 (1991).
274
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976).
275
Campbell, 138 S. Ct. at 1061. See also Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1340, n.10
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (rebuking the Court for “gestur[ing] at a potential
lifeline from other [state] institutions”: “The Eighth Amendment guarantees juvenile offenders like Jones a basic constitutional protection against disproportionate punishments. The Court should not leave the vindication of such important
legal rights to others, or to chance.”).
268
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rights and the determination of whether life without parole is a
proportionate sentence cannot be foisted onto an administrative agency without judicial review. As Justice Sotomayor emphasized, meaningful appellate review serves an important role
in ensuring that sentencing decisions are reliable and are not
arbitrary or irrational.276 Given the parole board’s constitutional obligation to assess what length of incarceration would
be proportionate for the juvenile parole applicant, meaningful
judicial review must be available to ensure the reliability of the
parole board’s decision.
B. Review Beyond Procedural Due Process Compliance
One argument that follows from the idea that Graham,
Miller, and Montgomery constitutionalized parole is that the
decisions created a liberty interest in parole for individuals who
were under age eighteen at the time of the crime. This argument would trigger an analysis of the procedural protections
due when the State purports to deprive people who were children at the time of the crime of this liberty interest. This is not
a new theory,277 nor should it be overlooked. Such an analysis
would lead to important procedural protections in juvenile parole hearings: the right to counsel, the right to present materials in support of parole, access to expert witnesses, and indeed
the right to judicial review.
Yet, an assessment that focuses exclusively on the liberty
interest in parole will not guarantee that the Eighth Amendment rights of people who committed crimes as children will be
vindicated. Under a procedural due process analysis, there is
no unfettered right to the liberty interest at stake. Rather,
there is a right not to have the government deprive you of that
protected interest without following a certain process.278 Conversely, the right to be free from disproportionate punishment
is not so dependent. The government cannot impose punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment simply because it
276

Id. at 1060.
See Bell, supra note 165, at 525–27 (analyzing how juvenile lifer jurisprudence challenges the Greenholtz paradigm, and arguing that juvenile lifer parole
decisions are subject to constitutional due process protections); Drecun, supra
note 165, at 731–33 (urging adaption of procedural due process principles to
juvenile parole cases to require enhanced procedures); Russell, supra note 165, at
417–18 (articulating the argument that Graham “trigger[s] procedural due process
protections” under Greenholtz, but concluding that analysis of rights for release
under the Eighth Amendment rather than the Fourteenth “could lead to a more
robust view of those rights”).
278
See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484 (1972).
277

R
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has followed certain procedures.279 Procedural due process
review asks whether a liberty interest might guarantee a certain process, but not a certain outcome. Under the Eighth
Amendment, the outcome of the parole hearing matters.
In Greenholtz, while the Court determined there was no
liberty interest in release on parole generally, the Court recognized that where a statute by its language provides for a liberty
interest in parole, some procedural protections may be required.280 Because the Nebraska parole statute at issue in
Greenholtz contained language that the board “shall order [a
parole applicant’s] release” unless certain conditions were met,
the Court accepted that “the expectancy of release provided in
this statue is entitled to some measure of constitutional protection.”281 The Court determined that the board’s practices of
allowing applicants a personal interview before the parole decision and of communicating the reasons for denial were sufficient for Fourteenth Amendment purposes.282
Juvenile parole applicants could assert a liberty interest in
their parole release based on Graham, Miller, and Montgomery.
Graham requires that juveniles convicted of nonhomicide offenses be given “a meaningful opportunity to obtain release
based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”283 Montgomery asserts that “[t]he opportunity for release will be afforded to those who demonstrate the truth of Miller’s central
intuition—that children who commit even heinous crimes are
capable of change.”284 As the Greenholtz Court explained, “to
obtain a protectable right . . . ’[a person] must . . . have a
legitimate claim of entitlement to it.’”285 Graham and Montgomery’s language arguably gives juvenile parole applicants a legitimate claim of entitlement to a meaningful opportunity for
parole based on demonstrated growth and maturity.
Yet, under a procedural due process analysis alone, an
individual imprisoned for a crime that occurred when they were
a child might be offered some procedural protections, but they
may still be forced to serve a disproportionate sentence even if
279
See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 79 (2010) (determining that the
Eighth Amendment requires a categorical rule against life without parole for
juveniles convicted of nonhomicide offenses).
280
See Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1,
11–12 (1979).
281
Id.
282
Id. at 15–16.
283
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010).
284
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016).
285
Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 7.
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they demonstrate rehabilitation. Procedural due process protections are intended to structure the board’s exercise of discretion by providing an accurate record on which to base a
decision.286 However, the parole board could have an entirely
accurate record of the applicant’s offense, background, youthrelated mitigating factors, and prison record—as well as evidence of growth and maturity—but could still render a decision
denying parole. Procedural due process would have nothing to
say about such a determination.287 And such an analysis ignores that no amount of procedure allows a state to require
someone who was a child at the time of the crime to serve a
disproportionate sentence.
A review of cases analyzing Graham and Montgomery
claims under a procedural due process rubric demonstrates
the limits of focusing exclusively on such an analysis. In
Diatchenko, the Massachusetts Supreme Court addressed
what constitutional protections were necessary for juvenile parole hearings.288 The court framed the question as “what is
procedurally required in order to protect a juvenile homicide
offender’s expectation of ‘a meaningful opportunity to obtain
release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.’”289 The court held that juvenile parole hearings required
access to counsel, to funds for expert witnesses at the judge’s
discretion, and to judicial review.290 The court asserted an
abuse of discretion standard for judicial review291 and
emphasized:
The purpose of judicial review here is not to substitute a
judge’s or an appellate court’s opinion for the board’s judgment . . . because this would usurp impermissibly the role of
the board. Rather, judicial review is limited to the question
whether the board has carried out its responsibility to take
into account the . . . factors just described . . . .292

Because the court’s focus was on the procedural requirements
for a parole hearing, its understanding of the board’s responsibility was correspondingly limited. The board must “take into
286

Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484 (1972).
See, e.g., Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 222 (2011) (per curiam) (“Because the only federal right at issue is procedural, the relevant inquiry is what
process [the parole applicants] received, not whether the state court decided the
case correctly.”).
288
Diatchenko v. Dist. Attorney for Suffolk Dist., 27 N.E.3d 349, 358 (Mass.
2015).
289
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010)).
290
Id. at 361, 363, 365.
291
Id. at 366.
292
Id. at 365.
287
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account” youth and rehabilitation.293 But no result is guaranteed from such consideration. The board’s determination will
“constitute an abuse of discretion only if the board essentially
failed to take these factors into account, or did so in a cursory
way.”294 This leaves open the possibility that the board will
consider a juvenile parole applicant’s youth and demonstrated
maturity and rehabilitation, and yet deny parole based on, for
example, the nature of the underlying offense. Massachusetts’s standard of review would not remedy such an
outcome.295
A New York appellate court also took up the issue of review
for juvenile parole hearings. In Hawkins v. New York State
Department of Corrections & Community Supervision, the court
determined that the parole board was required to consider the
defendant’s youth in making a release determination.296 In
that case, the parole board had denied Hawkins nine times,
most recently when he was fifty-four years old and had served
thirty-six years of his sentence, because release “would so deprecate the seriousness of [his] offense as to undermine respect
for the law.”297 While the Hawkins court recognized that “petitioner has a substantive constitutional right not to be punished
with a life sentence if the crime reflects transient immaturity,”
the court focused on consideration of youth as “the minimal
procedural requirement necessary to ensure the substantive
Eighth Amendment protections.”298 Because the parole transcript in that case did not reflect that the board had considered
youth in relation to the crime, the court held that Hawkins was
entitled to a new parole hearing.299 The court’s decision,
though, does not inform the board’s determination—only the
factors it must consider along the way. Hawkins emphasizes
procedures to the detriment of the outcome. As with Diatchenko, as long as the board considers youth, regardless of the
outcome, the decision would stand.
A subsequent decision relying on Hawkins demonstrates
the limitations of a bare requirement to consider youth. In
293

Id.
Id. at 366.
295
Sarah Mehta’s comprehensive report on juvenile parole review reflects that
in Massachusetts, since 2013, while the overall grant rate for juvenile lifers has
been about 37%, none of the fourteen juvenile lifers reviewed between August and
December of 2015, after Diatchenko was decided, were granted parole. MEHTA,
supra note 240, at 50.
296
30 N.Y.S.3d 397, 398 (App. Div. 2016).
297
Id.
298
Id. (emphasis added).
299
Id. at 401.
294
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Allen v. Stanford, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division reviewed the case of Michael Allen, who was denied parole
after he had served twenty-seven years in prison.300 The court
cited Hawkins for the proposition that the board must consider
“youth and its attendant characteristics.”301 Yet, the court emphasized that the scope of review “is narrow” and that
“[j]udicial intervention is warranted only when there is a showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety.”302 The court determined that the board had considered Allen’s youth, but
ultimately “placed greater emphasis on other factors, including
the seriousness of petitioner’s crimes and his history of unlawful and violent conduct.”303 The court highlighted the nature of
the crime.304 The court did not fault the parole board for assigning greater weight to crime-related factors than to youthrelated factors in reaching its decision.305 Thus, under Hawkins, consideration of youth can be subsumed by the nature of
the offense, and the board can deny parole for reasons unrelated to demonstrated maturity.306
The result of these decisions, which focus on the process
rather than the outcome of the board’s determination, is pro
forma assessment of whether the board gave some consideration to youth. Such focus does not shed light on whether the
parole applicant is in fact serving a disproportionate sentence.
Analyzing the board’s decision under the Eighth Amendment,
not just its process, is necessary to ensuring that individuals
who demonstrate rehabilitation are not held in prison in violation of the constitution. To be sure, if parole procedures entirely disallow consideration of youth, the board will be unable
to make the constitutional determination with which it has
been tasked.307 But, if review of parole decisions focuses exclusively on the procedures, it cannot ensure that the rights of
300

78 N.Y.S.3d 445, 446–47 (App. Div. 2018).
Id. at 447.
302
Id. (internal citations omitted).
303
Id. at 448.
304
Id.
305
Id. at 450.
306
See also Wershe v. Combs, No. 1:12-CV-1375, 2016 WL 1253036, at *4–5
(W.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2016) (granting parole board’s motion for summary judgment because board had considered age and maturity; nothing more than consideration of youth was required).
307
Sarah Russell and Laura Cohen have highlighted the need for procedures
that structure the board’s ultimate determination in order to ensure that parole
review is meaningful. Russell, supra note 165, at 415, 417; Cohen, supra note
165, at 1087–88.
301
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people incarcerated for offenses committed as juveniles have
been vindicated.
C. Proposed Standard for Judicial Review: Independent
Review
This Article proposes that a coherent reading of Graham,
Miller, and Montgomery means that in juvenile parole hearings,
a parole board must grant release unless it determines by clear
and convincing evidence that the parole applicant has not matured and rehabilitated. The court should review the board’s
determination de novo to assess whether there was in fact sufficient evidence to support denial. While the court would not
be conducting a rehearing, and would thus defer to credibility
determinations by the parole board, the court would not be
bound by the board’s assessment of the evidence.308 This is a
more stringent standard of review than that provided in most
traditional parole hearings. Yet, such a heightened standard
follows from the understanding of juvenile parole hearings as
vindicating the Eighth Amendment right to a proportionate
sentence; the reviewing court is being tasked with determining
whether parole denial violates the applicant’s constitutional
rights.309
Some jurisdictions do subject parole board determinations
to more rigorous scrutiny, even under the traditional parole
model. An analysis of their reasoning is instructive as to what
heightened review might look like in juvenile parole hearings.
While these courts style their standards as abuse of discretion
review, in practice they function like a stricter appraisal.
The New Jersey Supreme Court, while asserting that
courts should not reverse parole board determinations unless
they are “arbitrary or an abuse of discretion,”310 has described
the court’s review as requiring more exacting scrutiny. The
court has interpreted the standard of review as requiring the
reviewing court to consider “whether the record contains sub308
This may depend in part on which court hears the appeal. Jurisdictions
vary in their mechanisms for appealing parole board decisions. In some states
parole applicants file state habeas or post-conviction petitions, while in others
they proceed through the normal appellate process. See Table in Appendix. Assuming robust parole board standards, a direct appeal is recommended. However, if the parole hearing did not allow for full development of the record, a
habeas or post-conviction petition would allow for introduction of evidence directly before the reviewing court.
309
See Cohen, supra note 165, at 1088 (proposing less deferential standards
of judicial review of parole board determinations).
310
Trantino v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 711 A.2d 260, 262–63 (N.J. 1998) (internal citation omitted).

R
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stantial evidence to support the findings on which the agency
based its action.”311 This entails a determination of “whether
the factual finding could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence in the whole record.”312 New Jersey
courts have applied this standard to reverse parole board determinations in many cases where the court disagreed with the
sufficiency of the evidence upon which the board relied.313
In Trantino v. New Jersey State Parole Board, the New
Jersey Supreme Court held that the parole board’s decision
was not supported by sufficient evidence, and remanded the
case for rehearing.314 The parole applicant, who had been convicted of murder and sentenced to death, had his sentence
commuted to life in prison after the New Jersey Supreme Court
found the death penalty in that state unconstitutional.315 The
parole board repeatedly denied Trantino parole, based largely
on a requirement that he be placed in a halfway house.316
Trantino requested placement on multiple occasions only to be
denied by prison officials.317 The board recognized that Trantino had “reached his rehabilitative potential within the confines of his current state prison setting,” but maintained that
he needed to be treated at a halfway house so that it could be
determined whether or not he had been “fully rehabilitated.”318
In reversing the parole board’s decision, the court relied on the
facts that Trantino had no disciplinary infractions in over two
decades, that he had participated in dozens of work and recreation excursions to the community without incident, that he had
completed several programs with positive reports from program
supervisors, and that psychological reports provided favorable
prognoses.319 The court rejected the board’s finding that Trantino was avoiding responsibility for his crimes by claiming
311

Id. at 262.
Id.
313
See, e.g., id. at 270 (remanding to the Parole Board for a determination that
“must be based on whether there is a likelihood that Trantino will again engage in
criminal activity,” and on the defendant’s age, successful completion of work
detail, furlough, programming, education, lack of disciplinary infractions for almost three decades, stable support network, and positive psychological evaluations); Williams v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 763 A.2d 747, 751–52 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2000) (reversing denial of parole because record did not contain sufficient credible evidence that the defendant would commit another crime if
released).
314
Trantino, 711 A.2d at 261–62.
315
Id. at 262.
316
Id. at 264.
317
Id.
318
Id. at 265.
319
Id. at 266–67.
312
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memory loss.320 The court found that evidence in the record
showed that “Trantino’s memory loss is consistent, long-standing and genuine,” and that “his acknowledgment of responsibility is sincere and legitimate.”321 Ultimately, the court held that
“the Parole Board’s final determination cannot be said to be
supported by adequate findings of fact derived from sufficient
credible evidence.”322
In Williams v. New Jersey State Parole Board, the New
Jersey Court of Appeals reversed denial of parole to an individual who had been convicted of sexual assault of a child.323 The
parole applicant had previously been granted parole, but release was revoked for failure to register as a sex offender and
failure to gain approval of his change in residence and employment, despite the hearing officer’s recommendation that the
applicant continue on parole.324 A psychological report prepared for the subsequent parole hearing contradicted, without
reference, an earlier report that Williams was appropriate for
parole. The second report found that, “‘as long as Williams
refuses to accept responsibility for his anti-social acts, he will
be unable to progress in his rehabilitation and will remain a
danger to society.’”325 Relying in part on this new report, the
parole board denied release.326 The reviewing court determined that the record did not “contain sufficient credible evidence that appellant would commit another crime if released,”
citing the fact that Williams did not commit any crime while
previously on parole, and finding that the second psychological
report “[was] entirely without foundation and [was] contradicted by the empirical evidence.”327 The court reversed the
board’s decision and concluded that Williams was entitled to
immediate release because he was already less than a year
away from his mandatory release date.328
Like New Jersey, Washington State relies on a seemingly
heightened abuse of discretion standard. Washington’s Indeterminate Sentence Review Board (ISRB) is the administrative
body responsible for making discretionary parole determina320

Id. at 267–68.
Id. at 267.
322
Id. at 270.
323
Williams v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 763 A.2d 747, 748 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2000).
324
Id. at 749.
325
Id. at 750.
326
Id. at 751.
327
Id. at 751–52.
328
Id. at 752.
321
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tions in that state.329 The courts in that state review ISRB
decisions for abuse of discretion, which the Washington Supreme Court has interpreted to include decisions based on
speculation and on the nature of the crime.330 In Dyer, the
court held that the ISRB abused its discretion in denying release to a parole applicant serving a life sentence for two counts
of rape.331 On each of three occasions that the ISRB considered Dyer for parole, he had been denied.332 The parole board’s
reason for the most recent denial was his failure to undergo sex
offender treatment and an assessment that he “shows that he
is an orderly person, careful in his work and is able to maintain
himself within the institution[,] . . . precisely the behavior
demonstrated in the crimes.”333 The parole applicant had participated in numerous programs but did not complete sex offender therapy because he denied having committed the
rapes.334 Before his most recent hearing, a psychological evaluation found him to be a “low risk to reoffend.”335 The court
determined that the record did not support parole denial based
on any of the factors listed in the governing regulations, that
the board ignored the evidence, and that it based its decision
instead on speculation and on the nature of the crime.336 The
court emphasized that the ISRB may not “disregard the evidence presented at the hearing and base a decision on speculation and conjecture unsupported by evidence in the record.”337
The court held that such a circumstance constitutes abuse of
discretion, and remanded the case to the parole board for a
new hearing.338
While New Jersey and Washington have applied heightened standards of review to traditional parole board hearings,
California provides an example of a heightened standard of
review in juvenile parole hearings. In 2018, the California Appellate Court determined that juvenile parole decisions should
be subject to more stringent evaluation.339 In Palmer, the appellate court concluded that the juvenile parole applicant was
329

In re Dyer, 139 P.3d 320, 321 (Wash. 2006).
Id. at 325.
331
Id.
332
Id. at 321.
333
Id. at 322.
334
Id. at 321.
335
Id. at 324.
336
Id. at 323–24.
337
Id. at 321.
338
Id. at 325.
339
In re Palmer, 238 Cal. Rptr. 3d 59, 61 (Ct. App. 2018). The state supreme
court ordered the decision not to be published after granting review in the case.
330

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\106-5\CRN501.txt

2021]

unknown

Seq: 57

1-SEP-21

THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF PAROLE

13:45

1229

entitled to a new parole hearing because the board failed “to
comply with a statutory mandate to give ‘great weight’ to certain [youth-related] factors.”340 Palmer pled guilty to kidnapping for robbery and was sentenced to life in prison with the
possibility of parole.341 He was denied parole ten times, and
appealed the board’s most recent denial, claiming, inter alia,
that the board failed to give “great weight” to youth-related
mitigation and identified no countervailing evidence of dangerousness that would outweigh the youth–related factors.342 In
reversing the denial, the appellate court reasoned that “punishment cannot be imposed on a juvenile without giving ‘great
weight’ to the factors that account for the diminished culpability of youth offenders and, therefore, might point to the constitutional disproportionality of the punishment.”343 Thus, the
court concluded that this requirement “diminishes the Board’s
discretion to determine the bases upon which suitability or
unsuitability for release may be determined.”344
The Palmer court created a heightened standard for juvenile parole hearings and for review of those decisions. The
court explained that giving “great weight” to youth constrains
the parole board’s discretion and requires more than pro forma
consideration of age:
Untenably, the Board treats the youth offender statutes as
merely an exhortation for leniency, placing no limitation on
the Board’s unfettered discretion to decide whether a youthful offender remains an unreasonable risk of danger to society . . . and requiring only that the prisoner’s status as a
youth offender be acknowledged for the record and taken into
account in some undefined fashion.345

Rather, to give great weight to youth-related factors, “the Board
must accept those factors as indicating suitability for release
on parole absent substantial evidence of countervailing considerations indicating unsuitability,” and the court would review
to ensure substantial evidence supports denying release.346
Applying the articulated standard of review to Palmer’s hearing, the court concluded that the board’s decision “hardly apUltimately, the court dismissed the case after the state adopted new parole
regulations.
340
Id.
341
Id.
342
Id.
343
Id. at 69.
344
Id.
345
Id. at 72.
346
Id. at 71.
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pear[ed] to reflect substantial evidence of countervailing
considerations.”347 The board’s decision in that case hinged on
an apparent determination of immaturity based on Palmer’s
improper use of a cell phone to contact his sister about his
mother’s death and on his gifting his girlfriend one of his Tshirts.348 The court vacated the parole board’s decision and
ordered a new hearing.349 The California Supreme Court
granted review in Palmer in January 2019 but recently dismissed the case after new Board of Parole Hearings regulations
were adopted.350
This Article proposes a standard of judicial review different
from those described above. Because, unlike in Washington or
New Jersey, juvenile parole hearings serve a constitutional
function, courts must be able to review de novo parole board
decisions. Deference may be owed to credibility determinations, but not to an assessment of whether the evidence overcomes the presumption that the juvenile parole applicant has
matured and rehabilitated. Like California’s scheme, this Article’s proposal would allow the reviewing court to examine the
evidence required to overcome the presumption of release.
However, rather than adopt Palmer’s “substantial evidence”
standard, this Article proposes independent review to determine whether clear and convincing evidence rebuts the presumption. While the Palmer court used “substantial evidence”
in the colloquial sense of significant or weighty,351 in the administrative law context such a standard reflects a requirement

347

Id. at 79 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 78–79.
349
Id. at 79.
350
Palmer (William M.) on H.C., S252145 (Cal. dismissed Apr. 30, 2020). In its
order of dismissal, the court noted that, as of January 2020, new regulations
governing juvenile parole hearings had taken effect: “Because those regulations
now affect all of the Board’s parole suitability determinations for youth offenders,
and because the regulations were not in effect when the Board held the parole
hearing at issue in this matter, review in the above-captioned matter is hereby
dismissed.” Id. The Board’s new regulations set forth a number of governing
procedures for juvenile parole hearings. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15,
§§ 2440–2448 (2020). The regulations codify the requirement that the board “give
great weight to . . . (1) the diminished culpability of youth as compared to adults;
(2) the hallmark features of youth; and (3) any subsequent growth and increased
maturity of the inmate.” CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15 § 2445(b) (2020). In addition, the
regulations require denying parole when the parole board finds that “youth offender factors” are outweighed by “relevant and reliable evidence that the youth
offender remains a current, unreasonable risk to public safety.” Id. at (d). The
regulations do not address judicial review of the board’s decision.
351
See In re Palmer, 238 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 79.
348

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\106-5\CRN501.txt

2021]

unknown

Seq: 59

1-SEP-21

THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF PAROLE

13:45

1231

less than the weight of the evidence.352 As described in section
III.D., supra, juvenile parole cases require a heightened standard of review.
Independent judicial review of juvenile parole determinations would ensure that, absent evidence they have failed to
mature and rehabilitate, people who committed crimes as children will not be forced to spend the rest of their lives in prison.
With a presumption of release, parole boards ought to be granting parole for most juvenile parole applicants, meaning the
courts would not review most cases. Where parole is denied,
however, de novo review tasks the courts with assessing
whether there was indeed sufficient evidence to overcome the
presumption that only rarely will a juvenile be irreparably corrupt. The courts, rather than parole boards, will be the ultimate deciders of whether the juvenile parole applicant is being
forced to serve a disproportionate sentence. As in the states
that have operated under a more stringent standard of review,
the courts’ review of juvenile parole determinations will force
parole boards to rely on the evidence in the record and to take
seriously the Supreme Court’s judgment that the vast majority
of people who commit crimes as children are capable of rehabilitation and deserving of lives outside of prison.353
CONCLUSION
Once an act of legislative and administrative grace, parole
has taken on new significance in the context of juvenile parole
hearings. Now tasked with rendering valid the life sentence of
someone who committed a crime as a child, parole boards are
making a constitutional determination. This constitutional
charge has transformed parole into more than a purely discretionary assessment.
Yet, most parole systems do not have standards or procedures that address the constitutional task the Supreme Court
has assigned to them. Parole applicants can demonstrate reform and rehabilitation but can still be forced to spend their
lives in prison. And courts will have little to say about parole
board decisions.
352
See, e.g., Consolo v. FMC, 383 U.S. 607, 619–20 (1966) (explaining that
“substantial evidence,” as set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act, is “something less than the weight of evidence”).
353
See, e.g., Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 734–36 (2016) (explaining that Miller’s rule applies retroactively because there is a risk that “the vast
majority of juvenile offenders” are facing unconstitutional punishment; describing
Miller’s conclusion that life without parole is disproportionate for the “vast majority” of people who committed crimes as children).
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The constitutionalization of parole for people who were
under the age of eighteen at the time of their crimes requires
new standards to ensure that these individuals’ Eighth Amendment rights are vindicated. A presumption of release on parole,
coupled with judicial review of the board’s determination would
help ensure Montgomery’s promise that children who mature
and rehabilitate are not forced to serve a disproportionate
sentence.354
Such reforms provide an opportunity for states seeking to
make real the protections of Graham and Miller and Montgomery for the many people for whom parole is the only hope of a
life outside of prison. They provide a way to prevent that hope
from being illusory, to offer instead a real guarantee of not
spending the rest of one’s life under a disproportionate sentence of incarceration.
The reforms proposed here are not the only method of ensuring that people who commit crimes as children do not serve
disproportionate sentences. Changes must be made, and indeed are underway, to require that courts at the front end give
credit to the mandate that we treat children differently at sentencing.355 Further reforms aimed at eliminating mandatory
minimum sentences, decreasing sentence lengths, and keeping
more children under the jurisdiction of juvenile courts are crucial. Additionally, making parole constitutionally meaningful
for people who were children at the time of the crime does not
address the many serious problems that follow from spending
years, decades, or perhaps the rest of their lives under supervision.356 Indeed, ideally the sentence itself would change, not
only the location in which it is served. But the reality for many
354
See id. at 736 (“[P]arole ensures that juveniles . . . who have since matured . . . will not be forced to serve a disproportionate sentence.”).
355
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-91g (2015) (requiring courts at sentencing
to consider defendant’s age, “the hallmark features of adolescence,” and the science that shows the difference between a child and adult’s brain development);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 176.017 (2017) (when sentencing someone convicted as an
adult for an offense that occurred when they were under age eighteen, the court
must “consider the differences between juvenile and adult offenders, including,
without limitation, the diminished culpability of juveniles as compared to that of
adults and the typical characteristics of youth”).
356
In other words, this does not address the problem of mass supervision.
See Gwen Robinson, Fergus McNeill & Shadd Maruna, Punishment in Society: the
Improbable Persistence of Probation and Other Community Sanctions and Measures, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF PUNISHMENT AND SOCIETY 321–40 (Jonathan Simon & Richard Sparks eds., 2013); Michelle S. Phelps, Mass Probation: Toward a
More Robust Theory of State Variation in Punishment, 19 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 53,
53–55 (2017); Reuben Jonathan Miller & Amanda Alexander, The Price of Carceral
Citizenship: Punishment, Surveillance, and Social Welfare Policy in an Age of
Carceral Expansion, 21 MICH. J. RACE & L. 291, 291–94 (2016).
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individuals is that their sentence will not change,357 and that
parole is their only chance to be released from prison. Moreover, recognizing the constitutionalization of parole offers a key
normative shift in how we perceive the place and meaning of
rehabilitation in criminal system reform more broadly. It puts
rehabilitation at the center of the decision about how long
someone ought to spend in prison, and asks decisionmakers to
reflect not on the crime, but on the person before them.
Thousands of people have been sentenced to spend their
lives behind bars for crimes committed when they were children, and many state parole boards have already been tasked
with making constitutional decisions about how long these individuals should spend in prison. This Article proposes a way
to ensure that this group receives meaningful review and sees
the fulfillment of the Court’s promise that the vast majority of
people who were incarcerated as children will not be denied a
life outside of prison.

357
And for some people even resentencing can only result in a sentence of life
with the possibility of parole. See Russell, supra note 165, at 385 (explaining that
in many states that have abolished mandatory life without parole for juveniles,
under the new statutory schemes, a court may only impose either a sentence of
life with parole or a sentence of life without parole).

R
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Appendix
State Current
discretionary
parole
scheme?

Special
provisions for
juvenile
parole?

AL

Yes with
No
some limitations for
certain
violent
offenses1

AK

Yes with
limited
exceptions6

1

No

Mechanism
for judicial
review of
parole
board decision
Common
law petition
for writ of
certiorari to
trial court2

Standard of Overview of jureview for dicial review of
parole reparole decisions
lease decisions

Petition for
Postconviction relief

Reasonable
basis /
abuse of
discretion

Arbitrary
and capricious

The courts will
review parole
board decisions
to determine if
board acted in an
arbitrary or capricious manner.3 There is no
liberty interest in
parole, and so no
due process review.4 The board
“must comply
with constitutional requirements and may
not determine
parole eligibility
on improper
ground…parole
should not be
denied for false,
insufficient, or
capricious reasons.”5
“We review the
Parole Board’s
discretionary authority under the
reasonable basis
standard to insure that the

ALA. CODE §§ 15-22-27, 15-22-27.1, 15-22-27.2, 15-22-27.3, 15-22-

27.4.
2
See, e.g., Ellard v. State, 474 So. 2d 743, 748 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984)
(holding that writ of certiorari appropriate to review decisions of administrative
parole board); Tedder v. Ala. Bd. Pardons & Paroles, 677 So. 2d 1261 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1996) (petition for writ of certiorari is correct method to challenge
parole board’s denial).
3
Andrus v. Lambert, 424 So.2d 5, 6 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982).
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Alaska Stat. Ann. § 33.16.090.
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Standard of Overview of jureview for dicial review of
parole reparole decisions
lease decisions
Board’s determinations are supported by evidence in the record as a whole
and there is not
an abuse of discretion.”7
Due process Before discrecompliance tionary parole
was abolished in
1994, the court
recognized a liberty interest in
parole and attendant need for
judicial review to
ensure due process requirements were
met.11 Otherwise,
actions of the
parole board “are
not, generally,
subject to judicial
review.”12
N/A
Arkansas law
precludes judicial
review of an administrative adjudication re-

Duyck v. State, 2008 WL 269462 at *1 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008) (citing
Covington v. State, 938 P.2d 1085, 1090–91 (Alaska App. 1997)).
8
See S.B. 1049, 41st Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 1993).
9
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-716, 41-1604.09 (making parole eligibility and parole classifications applicable to individuals who committed felony
offenses before January 1, 1994 and to individuals subject to § 13-716 juvenile
parole statute).
10
See Sheppard v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 536 P.2d 196, 196–
197 (Ariz. 1975).
11
See Stewart v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 753 P.2d 1194, 1194
(Ariz. 1988).
12
Sheppard, 536 P.2d at 196.
13
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-93-614.
14
ARK. CODE 5-4-104(b), 5-4-602(3), 5-10-101(c), 5-10-102(c), 16-93612(e), 16-93-614, 16-93-618.
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Standard of Overview of jureview for dicial review of
parole reparole decisions
lease decisions

Habeas cor- Some evipus
dence

garding a prisoner.15 However, a
court will review
if the prisoner’s
complaint asserts
an infringement
of constitutional
rights.16 There is
no liberty interest
in parole release,
so no review for
violation of due
process.17
California courts
have recognized a
due process liberty interest in parole.20 Courts
will review decisions of the
board to determine whether
some evidence
supports the
board’s decision.21 The
standard requires
only “a modicum
of evidence.”22
A recent appellate court case,
ordered not to be
published after
the state supreme court
granted review,
relied on a

15

ARK. STAT. ANN. § 25-15-212.
Ruiz v. Felts, 512 S.W.3d 626, 628–29 (Ark. 2017); see also Clinton v.
Bonds, 816 S.W. 2d 169, 171–72 (Ark. 1991) (constitutional questions are exception to statutory preclusion of judicial review for inmates in DOC custody).
17
Ruiz, 512 S.W.3d at 629.
18
Cal. Penal Code § 3046.
19
SB 260; CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 3041, 3046, 4801, 3051
20
In re Rosenkrantz, 59 P.3d 174, 203 (Cal. 2002).
21
Id. at 205.
22
In re Shaputis, 265 P.3d 253, 265 (Cal. 2011).
16
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Standard of Overview of jureview for dicial review of
parole reparole decisions
lease decisions

CO

Yes24

Yes25

N/A

CT

Yes27

Yes28

Habeas cor- N/A
pus if constitutional
claim

N/A

heightened “substantial evidence”
standard for judicial review of
juvenile parole
hearings.23
The Colorado
Supreme Court
has held that
“the decision of
the board to
grant or deny is
not subject to
judicial review.”26
Connecticut General Statutes provide that the decision of the parole board “shall
not be subject to
appeal.”29 The
Connecticut Supreme Court has
found no liberty
interest in release, and affirmed that the
decision to grant
parole is entirely
within the
board’s discretion.30 However,
lower courts have
recognized that
the board’s dis-

23
In re Palmer, 238 Cal. Rptr.3d 59, 71 (2018), review granted and ordered not to be published, Palmer, 433 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2019).
24
COLO. REV. STAT. § 17-22.5-403.
25
SB 16-180 (COLO. REV STAT §§ 17-22.5-403.7(2), 24-4.1-302.5(1)(j), 1734-101, -102, 17-22.5-403(4.5), 17-22.5-403.7(6).
26
In re Question Concerning State Judicial Review of Parole Denial Certified by U.S. Court of Appeals for Tenth Circuit, 610 P.2d 1340, 1341 (Col.
1980).
27
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-125a.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Baker v. Commissioner, 914 A.2d 1034, 1043 (Conn. 2007).
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Standard of Overview of jureview for dicial review of
parole reparole decisions
lease decisions

cretion does not
allow it to deny
parole for constitutionally impermissible reasons.31
Writ of
Statutory
Granting parole
mandamus and regula- is within the
tory compli- board’s discreance
tion, and the
court’s review is
limited to determining whether
the board followed the procedures in the governing statutes
and regulations.33
Writ of
Abuse of
The board cannot
mandamus; discretion
deny parole on
habeas corillegal grounds or
pus
based on improper considerations.35 The
court will review
for abuse of discretion.36
Writ of
Gross abuse The court has
mandamus of discretion recognized review
of the parole
board’s decision
only where there
is gross abuse of
discretion.38

Cook v. Warden, 915 A.2d 935, 940 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2005).
Del. Admin Code. PAR 2.
33
Bradley v. Delaware Parole Bd., 460 A.2d 532, 534 (Del. 1983).
34
See Release Types: Parole, FLORIDA COMMISSION ON OFFENDER REVIEW,
https://www.fcor.state.fl.us/release-types.shtml (last visited Nov. 2, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/9N73-LBSY].
35
See Moore v. Fla. Parole & Prob. Comm’n, 289 So. 2d 719, 720 (Fla.
1974).
36
Fla. Parole Comm’n v. Brown, 989 So. 2d 723, 724 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2008).
37
GA. CODE ANN. § 42-9-45.
38
Justice v. State Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 218 S.E.2d 45, 46 (Ga. 1975).
32
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HI

Yes39

Yes40

ID

Yes42

No

Habeas cor- Rational
pus
basis

IL

Not for
offenses

Yes46

Habeas cor- N/A
pus for fed-

39

1-SEP-21

Arbitrary
and capricious abuse
of discretion

Judicial review is
limited to “situations where the
parole board has
failed to exercise
any discretion at
all, or arbitrarily
and capriciously
abused its discretion so as to give
rise to a due process violation or
has otherwise
violated any constitutional rights
of the prisoner.”41
Courts will review
the parole
board’s decision
only to determine
there is a rational
basis for the
board’s decision.43 However,
some courts have
recognized the
possibility of a
constitutional
claim based on
parole denial for
constitutionally
impermissible
reasons.44
Illinois regulations provide that

Haw. Rev. Stat. § 706-670.
Id. §§ 706-656(1), -657; Haw. Admin. Rules § 23-700-31(b).
41
Turner v. Haw. Paroling Auth., 1 P.3d 768, 776, 778 (Haw. Ct. App.
2000), as amended (May 9, 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).
42
Idaho Code Ann. § 20-223.
43
Ybarra v. Dermitt, 657 P.2d 14, 15 (Idaho 1983); Burghart v. Carlin, 264
P.3d 71, 74 (Idaho Ct. App. 2011).
44
See Drennon v. Craven, 105 P.3d 694, 699 (Idaho Ct. App. 2004) (recognizing petitioner’s constitutional claim that parole denial based on petitioner’s
legal actions against state officials would violate the First Amendment).
40
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parole is an act of
grace and executive discretion,
not a right.47 The
Illinois Supreme
Court has found
that the legislature intended the
parole board to
have complete
discretion, so a
court cannot
evaluate the
board’s decision
to deny parole.48
Habeas cor- Did board
Parole board has
pus
act within
almost absolute
scope of its discretion; the
powers; due courts will review
process
the board’s decicompliance sion only for procedural due process compliance
and to determine
whether the
board acted within the scope of its
powers.50
Petition for Unreasona- The Iowa Sujudicial re- ble, arbipreme Court has
view
trary, capri- determined that
cious, or
parole board deabuse of
cisions qualify as
discretion
“other agency
action[s]” and are
therefore re-

730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. s 5/5-4.5-115 (parole review for persons under age 21, effective June 2019 and applying prospectively).
45
730 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. s 5/3-3-3.
47
ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20 § 1610.50.
48
Hanrahan v. Williams, 673 N.E.2d 251, 253, 255 (Ill. 1996).
49
See Indiana Parole Board, INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, https://
www.in.gov/idoc/2324.htm (last visited Sept. 16, 2019) [https://perma.cc/
U6KS-8Q4P].
50
Murphy v. Ind. Parole Bd., 397 N.E. 2d 259, 261 (Ind. 1979).
51
Iowa Code Ann. § 902.12.
52
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 902.1, 903A.2.
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viewed to determine whether
they are “unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious,
or an abuse of
discretion.”53
Habeas cor- Statutory
For individuals
pus
compliance, sentenced before
arbitrary
1993, the court’s
and caprireview is limited
cious
to determining
whether the
board complied
with applicable
statutes and
whether its decision was arbitrary and capricious.55
Petition for Statutory
Kentucky statdeclaratory compliance utes provide that
judgment
parole board decisions “shall not
be reviewable”
except to determine statutory
compliance.57
The Kentucky
Supreme Court
has found no
liberty interest in
parole.58
N/A
N/A
Louisiana statutes and parole
regulations provide that parole
is a discretionary

Johnson v. Dep’t of Corr., 635 N.W. 2d 487, 488, 489 (Iowa Ct. App.
2011) (citing Iowa Code §17A.19(10).
54
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-3717.
55
Swisher v. Hamilton, 740 P.2d 95, 97 (Kan. App. 1987).
56
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 439.340.
57
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 439.330(3).
58
Belcher v. Ky. Parole Bd., 917 S.W. 2d 584, 587 (Ky. 1996).
59
LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:574.4 (2019).
60
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:574.4, Code of Crim. P. art. 878.1 (2017).
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ME

Not for
offenses
after
197662

No

Petition for
postconviction
review

Unclear

MD

Yes64

No

Petition for
review

Arbitrary
and capricious

MA

Yes66

Yes67

Postconviction
motion

Sufficiency
of the evidence and
statutory
compliance

decision not subject to appeal.61
Maine courts
have recognized a
right to petition
for postconviction review
of a parole
board’s denial of
release, but the
standard of review is unclear.63
Courts have recognized common
law jurisdiction
to review the
board’s action to
determine whether it was arbitrary and capricious.65
Massachusetts
appears to accept
limited review of
parole board decisions for suffi-

61
LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, Pt XI, § 705 (2020); LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:574.11
(2010); see also Sinclair v. Kennedy, 701 So. 2d 457, 462 (La. Ct. App. 1997)
(no remedy for claim that board improperly denied parole).
62
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-A, §§ 5801, 5802 (2017).
63
See Mahaney v. State, 610 A.2d 738, 740–43 (Me. 1992) (allowing appeal
via post-conviction review from denial of parole but holding that parole applicant was not entitled to appear personally at parole hearing, was not entitled to
parole because of the board’s failure to follow its own procedures, and was not
denied equal protection); Fernald v. Me. State Parole Bd., 447 A.2d 1236, 1239
(Me. 1982) (holding that Maine’s post-conviction review statute applies to review of parole denial for pre-Code sentences, but not clarifying the standard of
review).
64
MD. CODE ANN., Corr. Servs. § 7-301 (West 2017).
65
Pollock v. Patuxent Inst. Bd. of Rev., 751 A.2d 496, 499 (Md. 2000).
66
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 127 § 133.
67
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119 § 72B (persons between ages 14 and 18
are eligible for parole after 15 years); ch. 127 §§ 133A (providing right to counsel and funds for experts to parole applicants serving life sentences for crimes
committed before age 18); see also Diatchenko v. Dist. Attorney for Suffolk
Dist., 27 N.E. 3d 349, 356–67 (Mass. 2015) (requiring heightened procedural
protections for juvenile parole hearings).
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MI

Yes69

No

Habeas cor- Compliance
pus
with governing law,
“competent,
material,
and substantial evidence” (only
for claims
by State or
victim)

MN

Not for
offenses
after
198073

No

Habeas cor- Clear abuse
pus
of discretion; due
process,
statutory,
constitutional compliance

68

1-SEP-21

ciency of the evidence and statutory compliance,
as well as for
constitutional
claims.68
Only the prosecutor or the
crime victim may
appeal the parole
board’s decision.70 Review
shall determine
whether the decision is authorized
by law and supported by “competent, material,
and substantial
evidence.”71 The
court will review
a prisoner’s claim
that parole was
denied for an
unconstitutional
reason like race,
religion or national origin.72
Traditionally,
parole was considered an act of
grace not subject
to judicial review,
but courts will
review to ensure
procedural due
process compli-

Greenman v. Mass. Parole Bd., 540 N.E.2d 1309, 1312–13 (Mass. 1989).
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 791.234.
70
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §791.234 (11); Morales v. Michigan Parole Bd.,
676 N.W.2d 221, 227 (Mich. App. 2003).
71
Mich. Const. Art. 6 § 28.
72
Morales, 676 N.W.2d at 230.
73
See Community Supervision: How Supervision Works, MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, available at https://mn.gov/doc/communitysupervision/supervision-101faq/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2019) [https://
perma.cc/4UZB-RXAY].
69
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ance and to review allegations
of failure to follow
applicable statutory and constitutional principles.74 Court’s
review is limited
to determining if
there is a clear
abuse of discretion.75
Petition to
N/A
There is no right
show cause;
of appeal from
habeas corthe denial of papus
role, but the
courts recognize
jurisdiction to
review constitutional claims regarding the
board’s decision.77
Petition for Statutory
Missouri statutes
declaratory compliance; provide that dejudgment;
constitunial of parole is
petition for tional com- not reviewable.80
trial de novo pliance
The courts will
only review the
board’s decision
to ensure compliance with the
governing parole
statutes,81
though some
cases suggest the

Kelsey v. State, 283 N.W. 2d 892, 894 (Minn. 1979).
Edstrom v. State, 378 N.W. 2d 90, 93 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985), aff’d, 386
N.W. 2d 708 (Minn. 1986).
76
Miss. Code. Ann. § 47-7-3.
77
Mangum v. Mississippi Parole Bd., 76 So.3d 762, 768-69 (Miss. Ct. App.
2011).
78
Mo. Ann. Stat. § 217.690.
79
MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 558.047, 565.020, .030, .033, .034, .040.
80
MO. ANN. STAT. § 217.670(3).
81
Ladd v. Missouri Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 299 S.W. 3d 33, 37 (Mo. Ct. App.
2009).
75
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MT

Yes83

No

Habeas cor- Statutory
pus
compliance;
violation of
due process

NE

Yes86

Yes87

Habeas cor- Due process
pus, writ of compliance;
mandamus statutory
compliance

NV

Yes89

Yes90

Writ of
mandamus

Statutory
and regulatory compliance

court will review
claims that parole denial was
unconstitutional.82
Montana recognizes limited review to ensure
compliance with
parole statutes,84
as well as with
procedural due
process requirements, at least in
pre-1989 cases
before the language of the parole statute was
amended.85
Courts will review
for compliance
with governing
parole statutes
and with requirements of
procedural due
process.88
Nevada statutes
provide that parole is an act of
grace entailing no

82
Cooper v. Missouri Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 866 S.W. 2d 135, 137 (1993)
(addressing prisoner’s claim that denial of parole violated the Equal Protection
Clause).
83
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-23-201.
84
State v. Carson, 56 P.3d 844, 848 (Mont. 2002) (reviewing whether a
claimed statutory right to counsel at parole hearing was denied).
85
Sage v. Gamble, 929 P.2d 822. 825 n.1 (Mont. 1996); West v. Mahoney,
22 P.3d 201, 201 (Mont. 2001).
86
Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 83-1,110.
87
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-105.02; § 83-1,110.04.
88
See Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S.
1, 12 (1979) (analyzing procedural due process claim); Van Ackeren v. Nebraska Bd. of Parole, 558 N.W.2d 48, 50, 53 (Neb. 1997) (discussing both statutory
and procedural due process requirements).
89
Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 213.120.
90
Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 213.085, 213.12135, 213.1215.
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right or liberty
interest.91 However, courts will
review to ensure
the parole board
follows it governing statutes and
internal guidelines.92
Habeas cor- Arbitrary
The court’s repus
and capriview of the parole
cious –
board’s decision
modicum of is limited to
evidence;
whether the deciconstitusion was plainly
tional com- arbitrary, that is,
pliance
whether it is
supported by a
modicum of evidence, or whether there was a
constitutional
violation.94
Appeal
Arbitrary or Courts rely on an
arbitrariness or
abuse of
discretion – abuse of discremust be
tion standard for
substantial, review of parole
credible
board decisions.
evidence to The standard has
support
been interpreted
board’s
to mean that
findings
there must be
sufficient credible
evidence to support the finding
there is a substantial likelihood the prisoner
will commit a

Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 213.10705.
Anselmo v. Bisbee, 396 P.3d 848, 849 (Nev. 2017), reh’g denied (Nov. 16,
2017), reconsideration en banc denied (Jan. 19, 2018).
93
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 651-A:2.
94
Bussiere v. Cunningham, 571 A.2d 908, 913 (N.H. 1990).
95
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-123.51.
96
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:11-3.
92
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crime if released.97
N/A
N/A
Parole is a matter
of grace resting
in discretion of
parole board, and
court will not
review the
board’s decision.99
Article 78
Arbitrary or Courts will interappeal of
capricious
vene in the
agency deciboard’s decision
sion
only when “there
is a showing of
irrationality bordering on impropriety.”102 Review
is under arbitrary
and capricious
standard.103
Habeas cor- Due process North Carolina
pus
compliance; has recognized a
constituliberty interest—
tional com- and therefore a
pliance
right to due process review—in
parole for people
whose offenses
occurred before
1994.105 The
court also recognizes jurisdiction
to determine
whether the
board’s action

Trantino v. New Jersey Parole Bd., 711 A.2d 260, 262 (N.J. 1998).
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-21-10.
99
Owens v. Swope, 287 P.2d 605, 612 (N.M. 1955).
100
N.Y. Penal Law § 70.40.
101
See Hawkins v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 140
A.D.3d 34, 38–40 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016).
102
Silmon v. Travis, 741 N.E.2d 501, 504 (N.Y. 2000).
103
Id.
104
Crimes-Convictions-Structured Sentencing, 1993 North Carolina Laws
Ch. 538, at 2336 (H.B. 277).
105
Harwood v. Johnson, 388 S.E.2d 439, 444 (N.C. 1990).
98
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ND

Yes107

No

Unclear

Statutory
compliance

OH

Not for
offenses
after
1996109

No

Declaratory
judgment,
habeas corpus

Constitutional compliance

OK

Yes111

No

N/A

N/A

OR

Not for
offenses
after
1989,113

Yes114

Petition for
judicial review

Substantial
evidence;
regulatory,
statutory,

106

1-SEP-21

exceeds constitutional limits.106
North Dakota
statutes provide
that orders of the
parole board are
not reviewable
except for statutory compliance.108
The courts recognize challenges
to parole board
decisions on constitutional
grounds only.110
Oklahoma parole
board decisions
are not subject to
Article II of the
Oklahoma Administrative Procedures Act,
which provides
for judicial review
of final agency
orders; the courts
will not intervene.112
Oregon statutes
provide for judicial review of a
final parole board

Jones v. Keller, 698 S.E.2d 49, 54 (N.C. 2010).
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 12.1-32-09.1, 12-59-09.
108
N.D. Cent. Code Ann. § 12-59-18.
109
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2967.13.
110
Woodson v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 2002 WL 31722278, at *2 (Ohio
App. 2002) (“Because appellant does not allege that his parole was denied for a
constitutionally impermissible reason, the OAPA’s decision to deny parole is
not subject to judicial review.”); Mayrides v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 1998 WL
211923, at *2 (Ohio App. 1998).
111
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57 § 332.7.
112
Shabazz v. Keating, 977 P.2d 1089, 1094 (Okla. 1999).
113
Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 144.050.
114
S. 1008, 80th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2019).
107
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constitutional compliance

except for
juvenile
offenses

PA

Yes117

Yes118

N/A

N/A

RI

Yes120

No

PCR

Abuse of
discretion;
statutory
compliance

115
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order.115 The
court will remand
the case if it finds
that the board’s
exercise of discretion was outside
that delegated to
it by law, was
inconsistent with
agency rules or
practice, or was
in violation of a
statutory or constitutional provision; the court
will also remand
if it finds the
board’s order is
not supported by
substantial evidence, i.e. the
record would not
permit a reasonable person to
make that finding.116
A Pennsylvania
appellate court
has found there
is no right of appeal from a decision of the board
denying parole,
including for
constitutional
claims.119
State supreme
court decisions
seem to recognize
review under an

Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 144.335.
Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 183.482.
117
61 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6137.
118
18 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 1102.1, 6139.
119
Weaver v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 688 A.2d 766, 770–72 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1997).
120
13 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 13-8-8, 13-8-13.
116
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Standard of Overview of jureview for dicial review of
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lease decisions

Appeal with
Administrative Law
Court

Arbitrary
and capricious; statutory compliance

N/A

N/A

Petition for
writ of certiorari (common law)

Did board
exceed jurisdiction or
act illegally,
fraudulent-

abuse of discretion standard to
determine if the
board exercised
discretion within
bounds set by
statute.121
The Administrative Law Court
will review parole
board decisions
to determine if
the decision was
arbitrary and
capricious and
complied with
statutory requirements.123
There is no appeal from the
denial of the parole board.125

Tennessee statutes provide that
the board’s decision shall not be
reviewable “if

See Estrada v. Walker, 743 A.2d 1026, 1031 (R.I. 1999); State v. Tillinghast, 609 A.2d 217, 218 (R.I. 1992); State v. Ouimette, 367 A.2d 704, 710 (R.I.
1976).
122
S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-21-610.
123
Cooper v. S.C. Dep’t of Prob., Parole & Pardon Servs., 661 S.E.2d 106,
110, 112 (S.C. 2008).
124
See Frequent Questions: Parole, SOUTH DAKOTA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
https://doc.sd.gov/about/faq/parole.aspx [https://perma.cc/JU7LJGJX, https://perma.cc/W3BD-QP6K] (last visited Sept 16. 2019). Under the
system for crimes committed on or after July 1, 1996, prisoners will be released at their initial parole date unless they fail to complete their Individual
Program Directive. Id. After the initial parole date, subsequent hearings are
discretionary. Id.
125
Bergee v. South Dakota Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 608 N.W. 23 636, 641
(S.D. 2000).
126
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-501.
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ly, or arbitrarily

TX

Yes130

No

UT

Yes132

No

127

done according to
law.”127 However
courts have recognized limited
review to determine if the board
exceeded its jurisdiction, or acted illegally,
fraudulently or
arbitrarily in the
manner in which
it reached its decision.128 Courts
may also review
claims that the
denial was unconstitutional.129
Habeas cor- Due process There is no repus, writ of compliance view of a parole
mandamus
denial, though
courts may review for procedural due process compliance.131
Petition for Due process Utah statutes
extraordicompliance provide that decinary relief,
sions of the pahabeas corrole board are
pus
final and not
subject to judicial
review.133 Courts

TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-28-115(c).
Arnold v. Tennessee Bd. of Paroles, 956 S.W.2d 478, 480 (1997).
129
See, e.g., Swatzell v. Tennessee Board of Parole, 2019 WL 1533445 *3–8
(M.D. Tenn. 2019) (declining to dismiss claims that parole denial violated Ex
Post Facto clause and Equal Protection, and permitting amendment to allege
eighth amendment violation).
130
Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 508.145.
131
See Ex parte Geiken, 28 S.W.3d 553, 559 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); In re
Texas Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 495 S.W.3d 554, 561-62 (Tex. App. 2016);
Hills v. State, 2011 WL 5343690 *2 (Tex. App. 2011).
132
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5.
133
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-27-5(3); see also Linden v. State, Dept. of Corr., 81
P.3d 802, 805 (2003) (no state or federal right to judicial review of initial parole
release decision).
128
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Standard of Overview of jureview for dicial review of
parole reparole decisions
lease decisions
will only review
the process by
which the board
reaches its decision, but not the
decision itself.134
N/A
Vermont appears
to prohibit judicial review, except perhaps for
alleged constitutional violations.137
Due process Courts have recompliance viewed Virginia
parole board decisions for procedural due process compliance.140 It is unclear what standard will be applied in reviewing
new juvenile parole decisions.
Abuse of
The court will
discretion
review parole
board decisions

134
Preece v. House, 886 P.2d 508, 512 (Utah 1994); see also Foote v. Utah
Bd. of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734, 735–45 (Utah 1991) (due process review available); Labrum v. Utah Stat. Bd. of Pardons, 870 P.2d 902, 911 (Utah 1993) (due
process requires timely disclosure of parole files).
135
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 501.
136
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7045.
137
See Berard v. State of Vt. Parole Bd., 730 F.2d 71, 75 (Vt. 1984) (no liberty interest in parole warranting due process protection); In re Girouard, 102
A. 3d 1079, 1082 (Vt. 2014) (constitutional claims are reviewable by courts).
138
Criminal Sentencing Virginia Laws 2nd Sp. Sess. Ch. 1 (S.B. 3001); VA.
CODE ANN. § 53.1-40.01; H.B. 35, 3030 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Va. 2020).
139
In February 2020 Virginia enacted legislation creating parole eligibility
for individuals who were juveniles at the time of a felony offense or offenses
and who have served at least 20 years of their sentence. H.B. 35, 2020 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Va. 2020). The legislation reinstates parole for people who were kids
at the time of the crime in a state that had previously abandoned its discretionary parole system.
140
See Franklin v. Shields, 569 F.2d 784, 790 (4th Cir. 1977); Jackson v.
Shields, 438 F. Supp. 183, 184 (W.D. Va. 1977).
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1253

Standard of Overview of jureview for dicial review of
parole reparole decisions
lease decisions

for abuse of discretion to see if
the board failed
to follow its own
procedural rules
or acted without
consideration of
and in disregard
of the facts;
board may not
base its decision
on speculation.143
Habeas cor- Abuse of
West Virginia
pus
discretion / recognizes a libarbitrary
erty interest in
and capriparole. Courts
cious; due
will review the
process
board’s decision
compliance to see if the
board abused its
discretion by acting arbitrarily
and capriciously.146
Writ of cer- Statutory
The court’s retiorari
compliance; view is limited to
arbitrary,
determining
oppressive
whether the
or unreaboard acted withsonable
in its jurisdiction
and according to
law; and whether
the board’s action was arbitrary, oppressive
or unreasonable
and represented

Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9.94A.730.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9.95.110-9.95.116, 9.95-190
143
In re Dyer, 139 P.3d 320, 323, 325 (Wash. 2006).
144
W. Va. Code Ann. § 62-12-13.
145
W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 61-11-23, 62-12-13b.
146
Tasker v. Mohn, 267 S.E.2d 183, 190–91 (W. Va. 1980).
147
See Wisconsin Parole Commission, STATE OF WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS,
https://doc.wi.gov/Pages/AboutDOC/ParoleCommission.aspx
[https://perma.cc/K8M8-UQRX] (last visited Sept. 16, 2019).
141
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Standard of Overview of jureview for dicial review of
parole reparole decisions
lease decisions

N/A

its will and not
its judgment; and
whether the evidence reasonably
calls into question the decision.148
Wyoming statutes exempt parole board decisions from review
under the state
Administrative
Procedure Act.151

State v. Goulette, 222 N.W. 2d 622, 626 (Wis. 1974).
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-402.
WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-2-101(b), 6-2-306, 6-10-201(b), 6-10-301, 7-13-

402
151
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